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Contract Law and Christian Conscience
Val D. Ricks∗
What Does God Expect of Contract Law?
This essay proposes to answer that question. The answer has two
parts, both of which are essential. First, the canon of scripture
accepted by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints indicates
that the only proper role of government is to protect and promote
the freedom to obey the commandments of God. True freedom to
obey God’s commands includes, secondarily but necessarily, freedom
to disobey. I refer to freedom that is centered on obedience to God
as “salvific freedom.” Part III of this paper shows that protection and
promotion of salvific freedom is government’s theologically proper
role and that some kind of contract law belongs to it.
But a theologically proper role for, or doctrine of, the state is
only one part of the answer. The doctrine of the state is general and
by itself will not resolve specific disputes. Under what circumstances
is salvific freedom most fostered in the resolution of an individual
case? A focus on the goal of salvific freedom will not itself answer this
question without an understanding also of at least the requirements
of salvation, the practicalities of meeting them, the diverse ways in
which humans might serve God, and a sense of how one party’s
freedom is best balanced against another’s in order to promote the
ultimate goal. Sometimes harm to one party’s freedom to do right
must be balanced against the protection of another party’s freedom
not to observe God’s commandments. All of these other elements
are matters of faith, which Paul describes as “the substance of things
1
hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” “[N]ot seen,” “hoped
for”—he means unproved, at least. And some of these unproved
∗ Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. Thanks to C. Scott Pryor for
comments on an earlier draft, and to Rodney K. Smith for timely discussions of the topic. The
views expressed in this Comment do not necessarily reflect the views of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, the J. Reuben Clark Law School, or the Brigham Young University
Law Review.
1. Heb. 11:1. References to the Bible are the King James Version, unless otherwise
noted.
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elements will differ from case to case. In order for the law to serve
salvific freedom, therefore, the law must allow some action based on
faith in the resolution of individual cases.
This faith-based element of adjudication has in the common law
system frequently been called conscience. In fact, conscience’s role is
historically most obvious in contract law cases, where it has been
prominent since the birth of the common law. Part I illustrates this
point. Medieval English lawyers, formally all Christians, explicitly
admitted the role of faith or conscience in contract law adjudication.
Acts of conscience were, to them, law.
Has the practice of law since changed so as to preclude a role for
conscience in adjudication now? Part II answers “no.” Drawing on
the jurisprudential writings of A.W.B. Simpson, Phillip Bobbitt,
Pierre Schlag, and other legal philosophers, Part II demonstrates that
law’s post-modern practice shares with its pre-modern structure a
role for conscience. Law as part conscience is not a positivist view of
law, nor does it suggest that law springs solely from nature. Rather,
it freely admits faith’s role and encourages the development and
education of conscience among those who participate in lawmaking.
By the time the paper turns to Part III, where salvific freedom is
discussed, conscience can be seen to fill in the gaps left by the
generality of the doctrine of the state. Where published revelation
fails to guide, the jurist can learn by study and faith, and by seeking
further revelation, to serve the salvific freedom of the human family.
Part III ends with the proposal that the faith and conscience of those
who participate in law are best educated through the gospel of Jesus
Christ; the most righteous, honest, and wise will be the most just. As
the consciences of those involved in making contract law are
sanctified, so will contract law come to serve its theologically
ordained purposes. Salvific freedom and conscience thus answer how
contract law might best serve God.
I thank the conference organizers and the BYU Law Review for
the opportunity to express this view. Professor Andersen
unfortunately omits a Latter-day Saint (“LDS”) perspective on
contract law from his paper. His primary thesis categorizes promises
2
according to their moral and spiritual content. He suggests that our
legal treatment of oaths or marriage vows may be a moral barometer

2. See generally Eric G. Andersen, Three Degrees of Promising, 2003 BYU L. REV. 829.
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for our culture. And he argues that the recent legal trend of treating
marriage more like a commercial contract suggests that our culture
4
fails to see marriage’s moral and spiritual nature. These are
comments about culture, not law.
Professor Andersen does talk about law. But he describes laws
regarding economic promises, the oath, and marriage largely the way
5
any lawyer would. He describes historical and generally religious
6
perspectives on oaths and marriages themselves. And he suggests
that treating marriage covenants similarly to the way we treat
economic promises—allowing laissez faire—may ascribe to self7
interest more value than it deserves. But he offers no prescriptive
role for law, and no critique of law, and leaves us wondering whether
there is a uniquely LDS perspective on law itself. The negative
implication of Professor Andersen’s omission is that there is no such
8
9
perspective. The scriptures, however, clearly show one.

3. Id. at 831–32, 850–53, 858–60.
4. Id. at 853–58.
5. Id. at 833–37 (contract law), 838–41 (oaths and marriage).
6. Id. at 842–50.
7. Id. at 852–58.
8. Professor Andersen’s failure to discuss an LDS perspective on marriage law is a
significant omission, given his thesis. On that issue in particular, that omission combined with
Professor Andersen’s cultural recommendation gives mixed signals. Andersen criticizes the
trend toward laissez faire. This criticism might imply that some regulation is appropriate. But
then he suggests that marriage should be treated more like a “third-degree” promise, a
covenant with or before God. “Third-degree” promises, in Andersen’s terminology, would
function best when completely unregulated. See id. at 844 (“Third-degree promises . . . do not
create legal rights and duties. They operate in a different sphere.”); Id. at 859 (“Suppose thirddegree promising were treated . . . as mandatory in commercial matters. The result would be a
serious imposition on [unbelievers].”). Professor Andersen thus leaves the reader guessing as to
what role law should play in marriage.
I for one was hoping for some guidance. The LDS Church’s position on the role of the
state in marriage is unclear. Joseph Smith performed the marriage of Newel and Lydia Knight
before he had a license from the state to perform marriages. He reportedly said, “Our Elders
have been wronged and prosecuted for marrying without a license. The Lord God of Israel has
given me authority to unite the people in the holy bonds of matrimony. And from this time
forth I shall use that privilege and marry whomsoever I see fit.” SUSA YOUNG GATES,
JUVENILE INSTRUCTOR’S OFFICE, LYDIA KNIGHT’S HISTORY 29–31 (1883). This marriage is
also reported in JOSEPH SMITH, 2 HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTERDAY SAINTS 320 (2d ed., rev. 1976) (1951) [hereinafter HISTORY OF THE CHURCH]. The
Prophet’s statement indicates that marriage is a “third-degree promise,” to employ Professor
Andersen’s terminology, and that the state need play no role in its making. The completely
ecclesiastical regulation of polygamous marriages—marriages that civil law did not recognize—
in the late nineteenth century indicates that state regulation may not be theologically necessary
in some circumstances. EDWIN BROWN FIRMAGE & RICHARD COLLIN MANGRUM, ZION IN
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Recently, some legal academics have expressed a Christian
10
perspective on law. A few have discussed a Christian view of
11
contract law without giving theological underpinnings. Disciples of
Christ engaged in making and critiquing law must ask what Christ
requires of it. Consistently, some Christians often do not hold with
12
current, academically mainstream justifications for contract law.
Consider economic analysis: Professor Andersen notes that contract
13
law “cannot be explained without” it. True or not, Christians
participating in law need more than an explanation, and economic
analysis is insufficient. Contract law in the service of mere economic
self-interest (particularly if we already have sufficient resources to do
COURTS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS,
1830–1900, at 322–36 (1988). On the other hand, Church members have recently shown
strong support for some regulation of marriage. See California Bars Gay Marriage,
ABCNEWS.COM, March 7, 2000, at http://abcnews.go.com/onair/CloserLook/
wnt_000307_CL_Prop22_feature.html (last accessed Sept. 20, 2003) (reporting that
Catholics, Mormons, and Evangelicals raised millions in support of California Proposition 22,
which provides that the state will only recognize marriages between a man and a woman). The
LDS view of the proper role of law in marriage is ripe for delineation.
9. The issue addressed here, as I see it, is what God would ask of law imposed on
believers and unbelievers alike. I do not mean to suggest in any way that all or any of God’s
commandments should be made the law of the state and imposed on unbelievers. That would
destroy the freedom and agency that God has given and promised to all, including unbelievers.
See 2 Nephi 2:26–30 (Book of Mormon); Doctrine & Covenants 101:78; infra Part III. Nor
do I mean to ask what laws God would impose on a people who have covenanted to serve him.
Sources more relevant to that issue include FIRMAGE & MANGRUM, supra note 8 (describing
at length the efforts of early Church members to resolve all (otherwise legal) disputes by
binding arbitration within the Church according to the laws of God), and the Pentateuch.
10. Attempts to write about law from a Christian perspective are becoming more
common among people of faith. See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE
RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1993); CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL
THOUGHT (Michael W. McConnell et al. eds., 2001); Joseph Allegretti, A Christian
Perspective on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 997 (2001); Jonathan
Edward Maire, The Possibility of a Christian Jurisprudence, 40 AM. J. JURIS. 101 (1995); John
Copeland Nagle, Playing Noah, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1171 (1998); Kenneth A. Sprang, Holistic
Jurisprudence: Law Shaped by People of Faith, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 753 (2000); WILLIAM J.
STUNTZ, Christian Legal Theory, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1707 (2003) (reviewing CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra).
11. See Harold Berman, The Religious Sources of General Contract Law: An Historical
Perspective, 4 J.L. & RELIGION 103 (1986), reprinted in BERMAN, supra note 10, at 187;
C.M.A. McCauliff, Historical Perspectives on Anglo-American Contract Law, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 10, at 470. Neither McCauliff nor Berman
connect contract law to any general jurisprudence or theology. For a natural law perspective,
see HENRY MATHER, CONTRACT LAW AND MORALITY (1999).
12. See, e.g., Angela C. Carmella, A Catholic View of Law and Justice, in CHRISTIAN
PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 10, at 255, 262; infra notes 237, 263.
13. Andersen, supra note 2, at 833 (emphasis in original).
THE
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God’s will) equates to serving Mammon and is unacceptable.
Professor Andersen claims that justifications focused on respect for
personal autonomy are based on a “moral theory of respecting
14
individual choice and commitment.” That sounds better than
economic self-interest, but consider Charles Fried’s explanation of
this morality:
Everything must be available to us, for who can deny the human
will the title to expand even into the remotest corner of the
universe? And when we forbear to bend some external object to
our use because of its natural preciousness we use it still, for it is to
our judgment of its value that we respond, our own conception of
15
the good that we pursue.

Human will and the self’s “own conception” of the good are all that
matter here. God plays no role in this theory of collective human
hubris. Surely that rationale is insufficient as well.
The revelations of the restored gospel of Jesus Christ justify
contract law under quite another purpose, the service of salvific
freedom, as discussed in Part III. Part III in particular employs the
16
vocabulary of my own religious practice, but the Christian
principles that justify contract law are commonly shared by those of
many Christian faiths. Many Christians will also recognize that these
principles do not apply themselves, and that the discretion involved
in seeking this theologically justifiable end for contract law also
ought to be directed by God. This direction is an exercise in faith or
conscience, and it first appears in the common law in the medieval
period.

14. Id. at 834.
15. CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 8 (1981).
16. I am a member of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, also sometimes
called the Mormon or LDS Church. The discussion will therefore use primarily the Holy Bible
(the King James Version, unless otherwise noted) and the three other books held as scripture
by the Church: the Book of Mormon, the Doctrine & Covenants, and the Pearl of Great Price.
But because the Christian principles I discuss are widely shared in the Christian community at
large, the uniqueness of the sources I cite in the discussion does not limit the discussion’s
applicability. I do not speak for the Church and have no authority to speak for any other
person or group. I am sure that not all Church members (an extraordinarily diverse and
international group) would agree with the positions I take in this Comment, though I believe
based upon many years of activity in the Church, that many would agree with the positions
taken in Parts III.A & C, those most relevant to the non-legal aspects of this Comment.
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I. MEDIEVAL ENGLISH CONTRACT LAW AND CHRISTIAN
CONSCIENCE
A. Conscience in the Setting of Medieval Contract Law
A Christian influence made its presence felt everywhere in
medieval English law. In fact, England placed the law of marriage
formation—the law most relevant to Professor Andersen’s thesis—
17
entirely in the hands of the clergy, in church courts. The church, in
turn, through Pope Innocent III, took the position in the twelfth
century that a valid marriage formed when the parties gave their
18
present consent, whether done in church or in private. Therefore, a
private marriage, one in which neither the state nor the church
19
participated, was a valid marriage. And, in fact, many such
20
marriages occurred.
England’s ecclesiastical courts held such marriages valid even at
some spiritual cost, as the church perceived it. That is, the church
recognized that a wholly private, non-church marriage was less than
spiritually optimal. In fact, church regulations required marriages to
occur at church. Church laws also required that the clergyman first
give notice to the community, asking any who knew of legal

17. R.H. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND 3 (1974)
[hereinafter HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION] (“There was never [a medieval] English law
of marriage apart from that administered by the Church courts.”); Norma Adams & Charles
Donahue Jr., Introduction to SELECT CASES FROM THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS OF THE
PROVINCE OF CANTERBURY C. 1200–1301, 95 SELDEN SOC’Y 81–84 (Norma Adams &
Charles Donahue Jr. eds., 1978–1979 [1981]); L.R. Poos, The Heavy-Handed Marriage
Counsellor: Regulating Marriage in Some Later-Medieval English Local Ecclesiastical-Court
Jurisdictions, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 291 (1995).
18. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION, supra note 17, at 26–27; see also Charles J.
Reid, Jr., “So It Will Be Found That the Right of Women in Many Cases Is of Diminished
Condition”: Rights and the Legal Equality of Men and Women in Twelfth and ThirteenthCentury Canon Law, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 471, 491–98 (2002) (discussing the origins and
settlement of the canonist rule requiring consent).
19. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION, supra note 17, at 27; Michael M. Sheehan,
Marriage Theory and Practice in the Conciliar Legislation and Diocesan Statutes of Medieval
England, 40 MEDIAEVAL STUD. 408, 413–14, 429–30 (1978) [hereinafter Sheehan, Marriage
Theory and Practice] (reporting that the rule “that carnal union, following an agreement to
marry, would be regarded as marriage by the Church” was first published in collections of
statutes in 1213–1214 and 1217–1219).
20. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION, supra note 17, at 28; Michael M. Sheehan,
The Formation and Stability of Marriage in Fourteenth-Century England: Evidence of an Ely
Register, 33 MEDIAEVAL STUD. 228, 249–51 (1971).
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impediment to the marriage to come forward. But still, church law
did not invalidate marriages for breach of these regulations. A wholly
private, non-church marriage without notice to the community was
nevertheless a valid marriage under church law.
The church’s validation of wholly private marriages sometimes
occurred at great social cost. In Ingoly v. Esyngwald, for instance,
Robert and Joan married privately in a garden before witnesses in
1409. No consummation occurred, but in 1411 Robert married
another woman, Elena, at church, thereafter living with her as
husband and wife. Joan did not object at the time. In 1418 Joan
married another man, John, at the parish church. Similarly, Robert
did not object, and Joan and John also lived together. Twelve years
later, in 1430, Joan sued Robert in the diocese of York to enforce
the 1409 marriage. In response to Joan’s suit, the court dissolved
both Robert’s nineteen-year marriage to Elena and Joan’s twelveyear marriage to John, declaring Robert and Joan married according
22
to their unconsummated 1409 contract.
Not even the competing interests of the English state in
controlling feudal property relationships overstepped this
ecclesiastical law. Feudal lords and parents desired to protect feudal
tenure and family property relationships by controlling the marriage
23
of their wards and children. Feudal lords were in fact said to have
“bodily wardship” (custodia corporis) of an heir, which gave the lord
24
control over whom the ward married. But this power was not
absolute, because the marriage had to be consensual according to the
25
church. Medieval statutes therefore imposed only a financial penalty
on wards who married without their lord’s consent: the lord could
retain the ward’s inheritance for a time after the ward reached the

21. See Sheehan, Marriage Theory and Practice, supra note 19, passim (relating that the
thrust of medieval diocesan statutes was to curtail private marriage, even though the statutes
themselves never demanded publicity as a requirement of validity).
22. HELMHOLZ, MARRIAGE LITIGATION, supra note 17, at 64–65 (describing the case
from the records of the diocesan courts).
23. FLETA, bk. I, ch. 13, at 9, reprinted in 72 SELDEN SOC’Y 26 (H.G. Richardson &
G.O. Sayles eds. and trans., 1953) (c. 1290); 2 BRACTON [HENRY DE BRATTON], ON THE
LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 89–90 (Samuel E. Thorne trans., 1968) (c. 1240–1260),
available at http://bracton.law.cornell.edu/bracton/Common/index.html.
24. FLETA, supra note 23, at 9, reprinted in 72 SELDEN SOC’Y 26 (H.G. Richardson &
G.O. Sayles eds. and trans., 1953) (c. 1290).
25. Id. at 10, reprinted in 72 SELDEN SOC’Y 27 (H.G. Richardson & G.O. Sayles eds.
and trans., 1953) (c. 1290); 2 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 89–90.
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26

age of majority. In medieval marriage, “freedom of contract”
prevailed, mandated by the church and conceded by the state.
England’s church also made its presence felt in mundane,
commercial contracts. The church itself, through its courts, handled a
27
great deal of contract litigation despite royal court procedures
28
designed to prohibit such ecclesiastical intrusion. And religion also
pervasively influenced the common law outside the church courts.
Officers in England’s government were Christians. England’s
chancellor, the kingdom’s chief legal officer, was in all but a few rare
instances a bishop or a priest made bishop while chancellor or shortly
29
thereafter. The English chancellor’s office was to look after the king’s
and citizens’ souls. The chancellor in fact played a pivotal role in
creating the common contract law of England’s royal courts. His
influence was exercised primarily in two ways in the royal courts. First,
during the medieval era, most suits in the royal courts (and most
innovations in actions) originated with a writ issued by the chancellor’s
30
office. Few actions could be brought without the chancellor’s formal
approval. Second, the chancellor himself began eventually to grant relief
in contract and other cases under the general doctrine of
31
32
“conscience”; the chancellor’s court was a court of conscience that
26. Statute of Merton, 20 Hen. 3, c. 6 (1235) (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE
REALM 3 (photo. reprint 1963) (1810) [hereinafter STATUTES OF THE REALM]; Statute of
Westminster I, 3 Edw. 1, c. 22 (1275) (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra,
at 33.
27. See, e.g., Martel c. De Kimble (Canterbury c. 1201), reprinted in 95 SELDEN SOC’Y,
A.5, at 15–17 (1978–1979); Adams & Donahue, supra note 17, app. 1, at 104–14 (providing
a short calendar of selected Canterbury Court documents from the thirteenth century in which
numbered items 4, 7, 11, 19, 30, 45, 46, and 88 constitute breach of faith/agreement cases
about the time of Hubert Walter (archbishop 1193–1205)); R.H. HELMHOLZ, Assumpsit and
Fidei Laesio, in CANON LAW AND THE LAW OF ENGLAND 263 (1987) [hereinafter
HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW].
28. Charles Donahue, Jr., Ius Commune, Canon Law, and Common Law in England,
66 TUL. L. REV. 1745, 1764 (1992); R.H. HELMHOLZ, The Writ of Prohibition to Court
Christian Before 1500, in HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW, supra 27, at 59.
29. See generally 1 JOHN CAMPBELL, LIVES OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS AND KEEPERS
OF THE GREAT SEAL OF ENGLAND (John Allan Mallory ed., George W. Smith 1874) (1856)
(medieval chancellors).
30. See, e.g., ROBERT C. PALMER, ENGLISH LAW IN THE AGE OF THE BLACK DEATH,
1348–1381, at 104–07, 296–306 (1993) [hereinafter PALMER, BLACK DEATH].
31. W.T. BARBOUR, THE HISTORY OF CONTRACT IN EARLY ENGLISH EQUITY 150–66
(Paul Vinogradoff ed., Octagon 1974) (1914). Of the nearly sixty petitions for relief set out in
Barbour’s appendix, at least fifty appeal to conscience or request “for God and in way of
charity.” Many do both. Of those that do neither, three are not verbatim petitions but only
notes of reports of petitions. These appeals appear to have been standard fare in the 1400s. See
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competed with the royal judiciary and corrected its abuses. One would
thus expect the common law generally—not just contract law—to
conform to conscience. Indeed, medieval common law records contain
numerous explicit references to conscience, as Norman Doe has
33
catalogued. Statutes also were passed prohibiting actions considered
34
contrary to conscience. And judges adapted the law, sometimes
35
contradicting a statute, to conform to conscience.
also PALMER, BLACK DEATH, supra note 30, at 107–10 (1993) (tracing the emergence of the
chancellor’s court of conscience to around 1370 with the beginnings of it appearing in the
1340s); A.W.B. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT 398–99 (1975)
[hereinafter SIMPSON, HISTORY]. General relief, not just remedies in contracts cases, was
granted under the “conscience” heading. See, e.g., SELECT CASES IN CHANCERY, A.D. 1364 TO
1471, 10 SELDEN SOC’Y passim (William Paley Baildon ed., 1896) (listing petitions praying for
relief in Chancery from 1383 to 1471; praying for relief “For God and in way of charity” in
petition nos. 5, 6, 7; “in way of charity” only in nos. 8, 10–13; “pur l’amour de Dieu” in nos.
15, 17–19, 21–29, 31–34, and so on; praying for relief “as . . . conscience demand[s]” in
petition nos. 121 (1420–1422) (“law and conscience”), 123 (“reason and conscience”), 136
(“faith and good conscience”), 138 (1441) (“faith, reason, and conscience”), 139–41, 143–47
(1471)).
32. J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 114–22 (3d ed.
1990) [hereinafter BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY]; Timothy S. Haskett, The Medieval
English Court of Chancery, 14 LAW & HIST. REV. 245, 249–68 (1996) (reviewing scholarship
on the source and purpose of medieval chancery law and concluding with Baker that
conscience was the central element).
33. NORMAN DOE, FUNDAMENTAL AUTHORITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH LAW
132–54 (1990).
34. Id. at 137–39, 148 (identifying, among others, 33 Hen. 6, c. 3 (1455) (Eng.), and
20 Edw. 3, c. 1 (1346) (Eng.)).
35. Id. at 139–46. Doe discusses a number of cases, but one in particular was a leading
contract law case: Shipton [Shepton] v. Dogge, Y.B. 20 Hen. 6, Trin., pl. 4 (Ex. Ch. 1442)
[“Doige’s Case”], reprinted in 51 SELDEN SOC’Y 97 (1933). Doige’s Case is also reprinted in
J.H. BAKER & S.F.C. MILSOM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY: PRIVATE LAW TO
1750, at 391 (1986) [hereinafter B&M]. In Shepton v. Dogge, Joan Dogge bargained and sold
to William Shepton twenty-eight acres of arable land. Shepton paid in advance in exchange for
Dogge’s promise to deliver a deed at a later time. Before that time came, however, Dogge gave
a deed to the land to another. Shepton was not sure how to style his complaint, so he alleged
deceit and breach of an undertaking. All the judges convened to discuss whether the complaint
was allowable. They decided it was. A key argument in their decision was voiced by Newton,
C.J.C.P., who said:
Now, when the plaintiff has made a firm bargain with the defendant, the defendant
may at once demand her money by a writ of debt; and in conscience and in right the
plaintiff ought to have the land, even though the property may not pass to him by
law without livery of seisin. It would be amazing law, then, if there should be a
perfect [par fait] bargain under which one party would be bound by an action of
debt but would be without remedy against the other. Therefore the action of deceit
clearly lies.
B&M, supra, at 393.
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Thus, one would expect English royal courts of the time to
enforce parties’ agreements only if the dictates of conscience were
satisfied. Conscience, in fact, explicitly answered many of the hard
questions medieval courts faced in contract law adjudication.
In order to demonstrate how conscience provided the resolution of
medieval English contract cases, Part II.B outlines the contours of the
medieval common law of contract. That law was created by England’s
36
royal courts, the first common law courts, in response to plaintiffs’
attempts to fit cases within the bounds of the formal writs issued by the
chancellor or within prior precedent allowing recovery—in other words,
within an allowed “form of action.” Because those courts ruled only in
response to the needs of specific litigants, their system of contract
enforcement developed piecemeal. It remained a fragmentary system,
lacking any apparent overarching structure. Specifically, the courts
developed procedural mechanisms to resolve disputes in each form of
action. These procedures became the primary mechanism for regulating
contracts. The plaintiff’s allegations determined which form of action
applied, and the form of action determined which rules governed the
resolution of the dispute. Perhaps the only thread running through the
entire system, through the procedures of every form of action in which
contract disputes were resolved, was the courts’ reliance on conscience.
The system takes some time to describe, but the patient student will see
The last opinion rendered in the Yearbook report is Paston’s, which echoes Newton’s:
In your case the contract is good without any specialty. And a good contract must
bind both parties. What reason is there, then, why one should have an action of debt
and the other should not have an action? (As if to say, there is no reason, since in
right he should have the land.)
Id. at 395. The decision is “essentially a compromise between law and conscience,” Doe
concludes. DOE, supra note 33, at 142 n.47.
36. Courts were the lawmakers in medieval England. England had no real Parliament at
that time. The king would meet with powerful lords and heads of other powerful institutions,
and these people in power would agree to change existing custom, writing out their decisions.
This custom of meeting later became the House of Lords. See BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY, supra note 32, at 234–43. But most law resulted when less powerful people sought
help from a more powerful person. The more powerful person sat in his (and it was nearly
always a man’s) “court” to help those to whom he owed responsibility. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER,
The Changing Concept of a Court, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE COMMON LAW 153,
153–169 (1986) [hereinafter BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION]. When the burden of dispensing
justice became great, the powerful person appointed ministers as agents to hear pleas. In
medieval England, the most powerful person was the king. The king’s ministers to hear pleas
were called justiciars or justices. The justices could receive pleas even when the king was not
present, but the king was said to be “in court” where his justices sat. Eventually, the justices sat
at Westminster, near London, the largest city in England. The practices of these justices in
response to pleas and to writs from the king’s chancellor became law.
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conscience appear at every turn. Part I.B addresses each form of action
individually.
B. Conscience in the Medieval Common Law of Contracts
1. Covenant
A plaintiff might allege a contractual wrong in several ways. One
was to allege that the defendant promised or agreed to do something
37
and had not done it. If the plaintiff alleged this or the chancellor’s
writ required relief in such a case, the justices called the case one of
conventiones, which we roughly translate as covenant. Conventiones
38
meant no more than agreement, however, and had no limitations
39
with regard to subject matter. England’s chancellor began issuing
40
writs for the enforcement of covenants by at least the 1160s.
The justices enforced the writs, but only after disputed issues
41
raised by the writ were resolved by a jury. These issues might have
included questions about the existence of the agreement, its
contents, its breach, and resulting damages. The jury had free rein
when an issue was sent to it. The jury operated without instructions
on the law. It was told only the issue it had to decide.

37. See C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND
CONTRACT 255–67 (Greenwood Press 1970) (1949) (giving examples of a writ and of various
cases reported).
38. DAVID J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
22 (1999); SIMPSON, HISTORY, supra note 31, at 16, 18–19.
39. E.g., Statute of Wales, 12 Edw. 1, c. 10 (1284) (Eng.), reprinted in 1 STATUTES OF
THE REALM, supra note 26, at 66 (“And for that Contracts in Covenants are infinite, it would
be difficult to make mention of each in particular; but according to the Nature of each
Covenant . . . [they shall be enforced].”); IBBETSON, supra note 38, at 22; Morris S. Arnold,
Towards an Ideology of the Early English Law of Obligations, 5 LAW & HIST. REV. 505, 509–11
(1987).
40. ROBERT C. PALMER, THE COUNTY COURTS OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND, 1150–1350,
at 205 (1982) [hereinafter PALMER, COUNTY COURTS]. See also THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL, bk. 10, chs. 1–
4, at 116–18 (G.D.G. Hall ed. & trans., 1993) (c. 1187–89) [hereinafter GLANVILL]. Glanvill
omits discussion of covenant and instead stresses that the royal courts do not meddle in private
agreements. Historians are unsure whether royal courts actually heard covenant cases prior to
1200.
41. Joseph Biancalana, Actions of Covenant, 1200–1330, 20 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 18–27
(2002) (reporting that wager of law was available in covenant until the late 1200s, after which
it declined and thereafter trial was by jury).
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The jury was allowed such latitude for a couple of reasons. First,
the jury was thought to be the most knowledgeable forum for
resolving all disputes about the agreement in question. Trial was held
in a county where the jurors themselves would know something
related to the transaction. At least the jurors would know the
42
“constancy . . . and repute of the witnesses.” And the jury usually
knew local customs because jurors were all somewhat wealthy,
43
landed men. Hunger and poverty were thought to make jurors
more susceptible to subornation, thereby offending their
44
45
consciences, so the law required a certain amount of wealth.
Second, the jury would tell the truth because the jury swore an
oath to God that it would give a correct verdict: “To do in this
matter as God will give you grace, according to the evidence and
46
your conscience.” Juror stems from the Latin iuro, meaning to
swear an oath. A draconian punishment called attaint could be
47
imposed on jurors who were proved to have lied in their verdict,
48
but the severity of this measure precluded its frequent use.
42. JOHN FORTESCUE, ON THE LAWS AND GOVERNANCE OF ENGLAND 40 (Chrimes &
Lockwood trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1471). Fortescue was Chief Justice of the
Court of King’s Bench from 1442 until his political loyalties interrupted his service during the
War of the Roses in the early 1460s.
43. Id. at 37–38; J.H. Baker, Introduction to 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN,
94 SELDEN SOC’Y 107 (J.H. Baker ed., 1978) [hereinafter Baker, Introduction to REPORTS OF
JOHN SPELMAN].
44. See, e.g., 2 Hen. 5, Stat. 2, c. 3 (1414) (Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTES OF THE
REALM, supra note 26, at 188 (“whereby they offend their Consciences the more” [“pont ils le
pluis legierment offendent lour conscience”]) (discussed in DOE, supra note 33, at 146 & n.66).
45. FORTESCUE, supra note 42, at 37–38 (“They shall . . . have lands or rents to a
competent value at the discretion of the justices, otherwise they shall not be sworn, lest
through their hunger and poverty they may be easily corrupted or suborned.”); Baker,
Introduction to REPORTS OF JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 43, at 107 n.1 (“The usual
qualification was 40s. in value.”).
46. Baker, Introduction to REPORTS OF JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 43, at 112; see
FORTESCUE, supra note 42, at 39.
47. Fortescue describes the punishment:
[T]the bodies of those jurors shall be committed to the prison . . . ; their goods
confiscated, and all their possessions seized into the king’s hand; their houses and
buildings demolished, their woods cut down, their meadows ploughed up, and they
themselves shall henceforth be infamous, and their testimony as to the truth shall
nowhere be accepted.
FORTESCUE, supra note 42, at 39.
48. BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 32, at 156. The opportunity to plead
mistake or lack of intent to lie undoubtedly combined with the draconian penalty to reduce
prosecutions for attaint. Bracton reports, “There are others who speak a falsehood, but by
swearing do not perjure themselves, since they do not lie nor go against their understanding,
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Primarily, the juror’s obligations to God and the juror’s reputation
buttressed the juror’s obligation to give a true verdict. Furthermore,
Parliament prohibited those it considered to be without conscience
50
from serving as jurors.
Nearly all significant issues in a case of covenant were left to the
jury to resolve on their consciences. The jury’s decision was recorded
merely as a verdict for the plaintiff or defendant, with an amount of
damages if sought. The terseness of the jury’s decision reflected that
51
little if any of it was reviewable in a court of appeals. So, for
example, as a remedy for breach of covenant, the court would order
52
specific performance or award damages as set by the jury. Medieval
law considered the amount of damages itself to be a question of fact
53
within the jury’s province. But all we know of damage awards and
how they were determined in the medieval period is the amounts
given in verdicts. The legal records contain no other information. In
Baker’s words, “there were as yet no legal principles governing the
54
measure . . . of damages” for breach of an agreement. The law
since they believe it to be so, according to conscience, though the matter is actually
otherwise. . . .” 3 BRACTON, supra note 23, at 337.
49. DOE, supra note 33, at 146–48. The jurors’ oath bound them so that they might
even be thought to police themselves. In 1329, Justice Cambridge told a group of jurors, “We
charge you upon your oaths that if any of you is of the affinity of the plaintiff he is to challenge
himself.” Anon. [3], 3–4 Edw. 3 (Eyre of Northamptonshire 1329), reprinted in 97 SELDEN
SOC’Y 350 (1981).
50. 1 Edw. 4, c. 2 (1461) (Eng.); 11 Hen. 6, c. 1 (1433) (Eng.); 8 Hen. 6, c. 29
(1429) (Eng.); cf. DOE, supra note 33, at 146–57 (discussing these and other medieval
statutes).
51. The jury would hold for either plaintiff or defendant. If the jury held for the
plaintiff, the jury’s decision established the plaintiff’s allegations. These allegations became the
basis for any appeal after trial. If the jury held for the defendant, the plaintiff was held to take
nothing because his allegations were not established. The court’s procedure provided no
formal mechanism for a court of appeals to look behind the plaintiff’s allegations at the proof
itself.
52. Many early cases ask that the defendant “keep the agreement.” E.g., Benedict v.
Kersebroc, Curia Regis Rolls XII, pl. 495 (1225), reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 278
(“keep the covenant”); Cadigan v. Say (Eyre of Shropshire 1256), reprinted in 96 SELDEN
SOC’Y 48–49, pl. 119 (1980) (“keep the covenant”); see also Arnold, supra note 39, at 511–
14. Later cases ask for damages. See, e.g., Corbet v. Scurye (Eyre of Shropshire 1292),
reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 282; Welshe v. Hoper (K.B. 1533), reprinted in B&M,
supra note 35, at 286–87 (awarding damages); PALMER, BLACK DEATH, supra note 30, at 66–
68 (reporting specific performance as the goal of judgment, with damages awarded only for the
period of non-performance, prior to 1350).
53. Baker, Introduction to REPORTS OF JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 43, at 114.
54. Id.; see also S.F.C. MILSOM, HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW
330–31 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter MILSOM, FOUNDATIONS].
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assumed that jurors decided issues in accord with conscience, as their
oath required, and this sufficed. What the jury decided in conscience
was itself law to the parties.
The covenant action might have become the general law of
contracts, except that the royal courts hinted in the thirteenth
century, and held generally by 1350, that the promise or agreement,
55
to warrant recovery, must be in a sealed writing. The promulgation
of this rule was one of the few judicial intrusions on the jury’s role.
Non-royal or non-common-law courts might have continued to
56
grant relief in covenant on an unwritten promise, but not the royal
courts. The reason for the requirement of a sealed writing is
57
uncertain, but some judges opined sensibly enough that the
purpose of the sealed writing, also called a specialty or deed, was to

55. See, e.g., BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 32, at 363–65; IBBETSON,
supra note 38, at 24–28; Anon., Y.B. 14 Edw. 2 (Eyre of London 1321), reprinted in 86
SELDEN SOC’Y 286 (1969) (Herle, J.) (“Covenant is none other than the assent of the parties
that lies in specialty.”). Before the requirement was in place, if the plaintiff had no sealed
writing then the defendant could wage law. See, e.g., William Son of Benedict v. Kersebroc,
reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 278.
56. Unwritten agreements were probably enforceable in the Chancery, BARBOUR, supra
note 31, at 16, at canon law, HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW, supra note 27, at 263–90, and in the
borough, fair, and other mercantile courts. See Welshe v. Hoper (K.B. 1533), reprinted in
B&M, supra note 35, at 286; 1 BOROUGH CUSTOMS, 18 SELDEN SOC’Y 207–14 (Mary
Bateson ed., 1904); PALMER, BLACK DEATH, supra note 30, at 65 & n.6, 169–213; J.H.
BAKER, The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before 1700, in BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION,
supra note 36, at 341; Mary Bateson, Introduction to 2 BOROUGH CUSTOMS, 21 SELDEN
SOC’Y, at lxxix–lxxxii (Mary Bateson ed., 1906); David J. Ibbetson, Sale of Goods in the
Fourteenth Century, 107 LAW Q. REV. 481 (1991). Some other formality may have been
required, such as a handshake, drink, earnest money, or other token. See id. Eventually, at least
by around 1400, unwritten agreements for the sale of goods became enforceable at common
law in cases in which the parties set a day for payment, see infra note 71, and perhaps such
agreements were enforceable by 1321 if the buyer paid earnest money. See Ibbetson, supra, at
489–99.
57. Compare PALMER, COUNTY COURTS, supra note 40, at 198–215 (arguing that
covenant was limited to cases of sealed writing because (i) the Chancery required that standard
of proof in the county courts in actions begun by justicies writs of covenant, (ii) the royal
justices would have been familiar with that requirement because of appeals from county court,
and (iii) the justices simply adopted the requirement over by habit when the praecipe writ of
covenant, which originated litigation in the royal courts, became prominent in the late
thirteenth century), and Robert C. Palmer, Covenant, Justicies Writs, and Reasonable
Showings, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 97 (1987), with David J. Ibbetson, Words and Deeds: The
Action of Covenant in the Reign of Edward I, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 71 (1986) (disagreeing
with Palmer’s thesis and finding a genesis partly in Roman law and partly in the practice of
writing and sealing leases), and with Biancalana, supra note 41 (arguing that English officials
adopted a writing requirement as part of a general change in modes of proof away from wager
of law and a general change in the relationship between royal and local courts).
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show the will or assent of the party. The parties were precluded
59
from testifying in their own cases, on the ground of bias. A written
agreement sealed by the party in breach was more reliable evidence
of a promise than were non-party witnesses. At any rate, the
requirement of a sealed writing doomed the covenant action in the
60
royal courts. After the 1350s, the action declined as a general action
61
for breach of promise. The requirement of a deed, combined with
the pragmatic judgment of most plaintiffs’ counsel that an action
seeking a liquidated sum promised in a deed was more effectively
prosecuted in the form of action called debt rather than covenant,
forced covenant into obscurity. The debt action bore the load of late
medieval contract litigation.
2. Debt sur contract
If a plaintiff alleged merely that the defendant owed (debet) the
62
plaintiff, the king’s justices called it a case of debt. One kind of debt
action, debt on a contract, arose seemingly from a combination of
two elements: agreement and transactional form—both were
necessary. Transactions on which a legal remedy was predicated
appear to have been reciprocity-centered, almost proprietary: if a
transaction occurred which indebted the defendant to the plaintiff,
the plaintiff could go to court to get the defendant to hand over

58. Coleman v. Marham, Y.B. 14 Edw. 2 (Eyre of London 1321), reprinted in 86
SELDEN SOC’Y 353, 353 (1969) (Burton for the defendant: “the will of another can only be
averred by a deed”); Anon., Y.B. 14 Edw. 2 (Eyre of London 1321), reprinted in 86 SELDEN
SOC’Y 286 (1969), also reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 286 (Herle, J.) (“Covenant is
none other than the assent of the parties, which lies in specialty.”); BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY, supra note 32, at 363 n.12; IBBETSON supra note 38, at 26 & n.9.
59. BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 32, at 107–08.
60. IBBETSON, supra note 38, at 28; PALMER, BLACK DEATH, supra note 30, at 68–69.
61. PALMER, BLACK DEATH, supra note 30, at 68–69.
62. See, e.g., FIFOOT, supra note 37, at 217–54; GLANVILL, supra note 40, bk. 10, chs.
1–4, at 116–118. Glanvill gives an example of a debt writ reporting the allegation:
The king to the sheriff, greeting. Command N. to render to R., justly and without
delay, one hundred marks which he alleges that he owes him and which, he
complains, he is unjustly withholding from him. And if he does not do so, summon
him by good summoners to be before me or my justices at Westminster on the third
Sunday after Easter, to show why he has not done so. And have there the
summoners and this writ. Witness, etc.
Id. bk. 10, ch. 2, at 116–17.
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what was owed, almost as if it were the plaintiff’s property. Debt’s
requirement that the sum sought be liquidated contributes to the
64
impression that the action sought a specific item. Debt’s reliance on
both agreement and reciprocity is reflected in Glanvill’s list of
transactions in which an indebtedness would arise (contracts, as the
word was used in the medieval English, were limited to these
transactions): a purchase and sale in which the goods had been
delivered, a loan for consumption of the item loaned or for the use
65
of it, a lease, or a deposit. Performance of requested services also
66
qualified. After such a loan, sale, lease, or deposit, an item of
property—or in the case of performance of services, the services
themselves—had been given or granted to the defendant. The debt
plaintiff merely sought either the return of the item itself or what was
67
supposedly granted in exchange for that item. Debt’s reliance on

63. The debt writ reflected proprietary concepts in that it asked for money the
defendant “is unjustly withholding from” the plaintiff. See GLANVILL, supra note 40, bk. 10,
ch. 2, at 116. On debt’s proprietary nature, see IBBETSON, supra note 38, at 18–19; SIMPSON,
HISTORY, supra note 31, at 75–80. On debt’s grounding in assent, see, for example, Somer v.
Sapurton, Y.B. 7 Hen. 6, fol. 5, Mich., pl. 9 (Ex. Ch. 1428), reprinted in 51 SELDEN SOC’Y
38, 42 (1933), also reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 234, 235 (Vampage, apprentice: “for
[debt] begins by contract and consent of the parties, and the demand is an indebtedness, and
the basis of the action is an indebtedness.”).
64. The debt sur contract plaintiff could not proceed unless the item or the amount of
damages claimed was certain, or liquidated. E.g., Anon., Y.B. 14 Edw. 2 (Eyre of London
1321), reprinted in 86 SELDEN SOC’Y 334–35 (1969); see IBBETSON, supra note 38, at 31;
SIMPSON, HISTORY supra note 31, at 61–70. This was no difficulty if the parties had set the
amount of damages clearly in their agreement or if the amount could be established easily by
some calculation or reference to a government regulation or even clear custom. IBBETSON,
supra note 38, at 31 (giving precedent that settled these circumstances in favor of recovery).
But the case of the worker who charged only a reasonable price was more difficult. Simpson
supposes that this rule was only a pleading rule and not fatal. The worker might allege as a
“sum certain” what he thought was a reasonable price. Historians have found that if the
worker reached the jury and could convince them to agree with him, no rule that said he could
not succeed. SIMPSON, HISTORY, supra note 31, at 65. In that case the requirement of a sum
certain appears somewhat fictional. More common, however, would be for the defendant to
defend such a suit by waging law. Occasionally judges departed from the declared damages, to
the surprise of reporters. E.g., Anon., Y.B. 12 Edw. 2, Pasch., pl. 53 (1319), reprinted in 81
SELDEN SOC’Y 45 (1964) (“BEREFORD, C.J. awarded that he should recover his debt and his
damages of sixty pounds more than what he counted—which was astonishing . . . .”); Anon.,
Y.B. 12 Edw. 2, Trin., pl. 14 (1319), reprinted in 81 SELDEN SOC’Y 85 (1964) (reporting that
the judge cut the plaintiff’s damages for equitable reasons).
65. GLANVILL, supra note 40, bk. 10, chs. 3–18, at 117–32.
66. See, e.g., Anon., Y.B. 11 & 12 Edw. 3, Rolls Series 587 (1338), reprinted in B&M,
supra note 35, at 228–29 (debt for an attorney’s retainer).
67. See id.

1008

RIC-FIN2

993]

2/5/2004 4:41 PM

Contract Law and Christian Conscience

the reciprocity concept grew stronger throughout the medieval
68
period, becoming embodied in the phrase quid pro quo. But
Glanvill’s early list (c. 1189) was open-ended. Exactly which other
69
transactions would raise a debt remained uncertain. Milsom
suggested that local customs may have differed as to the
70
circumstances that caused indebtedness. Indeed, these customs later
dealt quite flexibly even with the reciprocity requirement. Medieval
courts eventually held that a sale of goods would be enforceable even
if nothing had yet changed hands, if the parties had agreed on a
71
specific day for payment. And an employee could bring an action in
debt for wages without having performed, if he had been ready and
72
willing. But the reciprocal character of the debt allegation
distinguished it from cases of covenant, which rested merely on the
73
defendant’s agreement.
68. IBBETSON, supra note 38, at 80–83; John Barton, The Medieval Contract, in
TOWARDS A GENERAL LAW OF CONTRACT 15 (John Barton ed., 1990).
69. See Barton, supra note 68, at 15. A promise of marriage money might raise a debt,
Fransseys’ Case, Y.B. 21 & 22 Edw. 1, Rolls Series 599 (Eyre of Middlesex c. 1294), reprinted
in B&M, supra note 35, at 227–28 (suggesting an action might lie), or it might not, Anon.,
Y.B. 37 Hen. 6, fol. 8, Mich., pl. 18 (C.P. 1458), reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 236–
39 (recording the conflicting opinions of several judges on whether debt lies for marriage
money, with Prysot, Ashton, and Danby saying no, and Danvers and Moyle saying yes, but
adjourning without decision).
70. MILSOM, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 54; S.F.C. MILSOM, Law and Fact in Legal
Development [hereinafter MILSOM, Law and Fact], in STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF THE
COMMON LAW 171, 175 (1985) [hereinafter MILSOM, STUDIES]. The basis of custom for an
action of debt is evident in Anon., Y.B. 43 Edw. 3, fol. 11, Pasch, pl. 1 (1369), reprinted in
B&M, supra note 35, at 229–30 (custom of London that debtor has a duty to recompense his
surety who has paid the debtor’s debts, even though the debtor has made no written, sealed
promise to repay); Anon., 3–4 Edw. 3, Hil. (Eyre of Northamptonshire 1330), reprinted in 98
SELDEN SOC’Y 637–38 (1982) (debt based on a custom of Northamptonshire regarding how a
decedent’s assets would be divided up among his children by executors); Anon., 3–4 Edw. 3,
Hil. (Eyre of Northamptonshire 1330), 98 SELDEN SOC’Y 638–39 (1982) (debt based on
intent of a testator with respect to estate assets).
71. See Veer v. York, Y.B. 49 Hen. 6, Hil., pl. 4 (1470), reprinted in 47 SELDEN SOC’Y
163–65 (1930); Stoughton v. Love (1397), reprinted in 100 SELDEN SOC’Y 177–79 (1984);
see also 1 Dyer 29b–30a, 73 Eng. Rep. 65, 66 (“And this diversity was taken, when the day of
payment is limited, and when not: in the first case, the contract is good immediately, and an
action lies upon it without payment; but in the other not so: as if a man buy of a draper twenty
yards of cloth, the bargain is void, if he do not pay the money at the price agreed upon
immediately; but if the day of payment be appointed by agreement of the parties, in that case,
one shall have his action of debt, the other an action of detinue.”).
72. IBBETSON, supra note 38, at 75.
73. For instance, Glanvill notes with respect to sales,
A purchase and sale is effectively complete when the contracting parties have agreed
on the price, provided that this is followed by delivery of the thing purchased and sold,
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The debt action was also resolved on conscience, though not
always exercised by a jury. Trial of a case of debt sur contract was by
74
75
jury or wager of law, as the defendant might elect. A defendant
waged his law by (a) swearing an oath that he was not indebted to
76
the plaintiff—that he owed nothing —and (b) producing eleven
other “compurgators” or oath-helpers to swear to the defendant’s
77
credibility. If the defendant could swear and find eleven others to
swear with him, he could go free and no one would ever examine the
evidence against him. Thus debt sur contract cases could be resolved
on the oath of the defendant and his compurgators.
It was thus possible to lie one’s way out of a debt. But in practice
78
such deceit probably did not happen often. The medieval mind
79
took oaths seriously. Conscience mattered. Wager of law was
or by payment of the whole or part of the price, or at least by the giving and receipt of
earnest.
GLANVILL, supra note 40, bk. 10, ch. 14, at 129 (emphasis added). Completeness depends on
part performance, and enforceability depends on completeness, as Glanvill negatively implies in
the next sentence: “In the first two cases neither contracting party may at will withdraw from
the contract, unless for some just and reasonable cause . . . .” Id.
74. Wager of law had been available in covenant actions until the courts began to
require the plaintiff to show a writing sealed (a deed) by the defendant. See supra text
accompanying notes 55–60. The deed was a public act, however, and wager of law was not
available to disprove a deed. See Aubrey v. Flory, Y.B. 14 Edw. 2 (Eyre of London 1321),
reprinted in 86 SELDEN SOC’Y 235, 237 (1969) (“HERLE, J. When a covenant begins with a
specialty it would be marvellous (for the defendant) to be admitted to make his law, therefore
bear in mind that your answer amounts to no more than that you have kept your covenant,
and that naturally is matter for the country.”).
75. See Anon., Y.B. 2 Edw. 2 (c. 1292–1297), reprinted in 19 SELDEN SOC’Y app. 1, pl.
3, at 195 (1904), B&M, supra note 35, at 210; Anon., Y.B. 3–4 Edw. 3, Hil. (Eyre of
Northamptonshire 1330), reprinted in 98 SELDEN SOC’Y 744 (1982) (opting to wage law).
76. Anon. [2], Y.B. 12 Edw. 2, Mich., pl. 19 (1318), reprinted in 65 SELDEN SOC’Y 24
(1946), reports the oath’s substantive assertion: “[I] do not owe ten marks to [X], nor any
penny alleged to have been borrowed by [me] from him on such and such a day . . . .”
77. On the wager of law procedure generally, see BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY,
supra note 32, at 87–88; SIMPSON, HISTORY, supra note 31, at 137–40.
78. See generally BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 36, at 424–26. Defendants ill
or in prison could not wage their law. SIMPSON, HISTORY, supra note 31, at 139.
79. IBBETSON, supra note 38, at 32. Ibbetson reports the fifteenth-century case Ocle v.
Clypesby, for instance, in which A had been imprisoned by B, who was claiming A as his villein, until
A had sworn “an oath on the gospels that he would arrange for third parties to enter an obligation
on his behalf.” Id. at 72–73. After B released A, A procured the obligation, then requested that the
chancellor declare it cancelled. Id. at 73. A chose to keep his oath and seek to undo the resulting
harm rather than break his oath.
The much later case Damport v. Sympson, Cro. Eliz. 520, 78 Eng. Rep. 769 (Q.B.
1596), makes explicit the common law’s assumption that what was spoken under oath was
true:
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appropriate because the activities that formed the contract were done
80
in secret. “In secret things,” Francis Bacon later argued, “the trial
of them is . . . Deum et partem [God and the party], as in wager of
81
law.” The theory, according to Bacon, was that “Deus veritas est
[God is truth]” and, quoting Hebrews 6:16, that “an oath . . . is . . .
82
an end to all strife.” But the wagerer’s soul became legally
important. Thus, defendants’ counsel can be found in medieval case
reports asking the judges whether their clients could in good
83
conscience swear that no debt existed. “As Hankford JCP
[T]he law intends the oath of every man to be true; and therefore until [1487] . . .
there was not any punishment for any false oath of any witness at the common law:
and now there is a form of punishment for perjury provided by the statute of [1562–
63] . . . . [A]t the common law there was not any course in law to punish perjury:
but yet before the statute of [1487] the King’s Council used to assemble, and
punished such perjuries at their discretion. . . . And it appears . . . that at the
common law there was no punishment for perjury but in case of attaint; but in the
Spiritual Court pro laesione fidei in cases spiritual they used to punish them . . . this
oath, which is secret, . . . cannot be tried . . . .
Id. at 521, 78 Eng. Rep. at 769.
The Eyre of London in 1321 presents numerous examples of medieval judicial reliance
on oaths. A major percentage of judicial action rested on an oath-bound recommendation
from a jury or other inquest or group of officials. See generally 1–2 EYRE OF LONDON, 14
EDWARD II, A.D. 1321, in 85–86 SELDEN SOC’Y (Helen M. Cam ed., 1968–69); Rules for the
Conduct of the Citizens During an Eyre, in 85 SELDEN SOC’Y 5, Nos. XIII–XVI, at 8–9
(describing wager of law for clearing oneself of crimes); The Third Day, in 85 SELDEN SOC’Y at
18 (swearing of Eyre officials); The Fourth Day, in 85 SELDEN SOC’Y at 21 (swearing of
officials designated to establish set prices for food during the Eyre); The Sixth Day, in 85
SELDEN SOC’Y at 26–27 (swearing an investigative jury); The Tenth Day, in 85 SELDEN SOC’Y
at 28–30 (swearing an inquest to determine whether the city’s poulterers’ businesses would
survive the prices set by the designated food officials).
80. A Lecture on Wager of Law (15th century), in B&M, supra note 35, at 214–15
[hereinafter Lecture on Wager of Law]. The fact that wager was to protect debtors against fraud
in previously informal, unrecorded transactions explains why debt could not be brought
against executors for the testator’s debts if the testator could have waged law. See, e.g., Anon.
[2], Y.B. 14 Edw. 2 (Eyre of London 1321), reprinted in 86 SELDEN SOC’Y 346 (1969);
Wakefield v. Prioress of Hampole, Y.B. 12 Edw. 2, Mich., pl. 38 (1318), reprinted in 65
SELDEN SOC’Y 53, 54–55 (1946). The executors knew nothing about the transaction. An
abbot was also liable for his monks’ debts but was unable to wage law for a monk since the
abbot knew nothing of the transaction. Anon., Y.B. 12 Edw. 2, Hil., pl. 39 (1319), reprinted
in 70 SELDEN SOC’Y 89 (1951). Therefore, the abbot or prior was not liable unless the
plaintiff could show that the monk was obligated by deed. Frome v. Prior of Witham & Thyk,
Y.B. 10 Edw. 2, Mich., pl. 35 (1316), reprinted in 52 SELDEN SOC’Y 102 (1934).
81. BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 36, at 401.
82. Id. (reporting arguments from Slade’s Case (1602), in which Bacon cited Hebrews
6:16 (King James): “finis omnis controversie est iuramentum” in support of wager of law).
83. DOE, supra note 33, at 150–53 & n.89; see also IBBETSON, supra note 38, at 32;
S.F.C. Milsom, Sale of Goods in the Fifteenth Century, 77 LAW Q. REV. 257, 267–68 (1961).
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succinctly pointed out . . . , ‘he [the defendant] can have his law, if
84
the truth be such in conscience.’” And the oath’s sacredness was
why wager might not be accepted if the defendant appeared to
85
hesitate or changed the oath’s words. Conscience also occasionally
86
stopped eleven compurgators from joining the defendant. Wager
thus resolved cases according to the conscience of the defendant and
his compurgators. Their act of conscience became the law for that
case.
Reputational interests also ensured that wager was not sworn
lightly. The population of medieval England was small, at most not
87
more than 6.5 million people just prior to the Black Plague. In
many cases, waging one’s law must have been, in Ibbetson’s words,
“tantamount to admitting liability and refusing to pay the debt
88
due.” Reputation and the financial consequences flowing from a
89
public admission of this sort deterred abuse.
When reinforced by conscience and reputational interests, wager
of law was effective to protect honest defendants from fraudulent
claims. Suits in which wager of law was available—suits on an
unsealed, often unwritten, contractual agreement—normally
90
involved relatively small debts. Such debts usually resulted from
private contracts between individuals, and such contracts would have
91
been difficult to prove or disprove, especially given that the parties
themselves were not allowed to testify. The defendant may never

84. DOE, supra note 33, at 150 & n.87 (quoting Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, 50, 27 (1410): “il
puit aver son ley, si le verity soit tiel en conscience”).
85. PALMER, COUNTY COURTS, supra note 40, at 224.
86. PALMER, BLACK DEATH, supra note 30, at 70.
87. See J.L. BOLTON, THE MEDIEVAL ENGLISH ECONOMY, 1150–1500, at 45–81
(1980) (discussing J.C. RUSSELL, BRITISH MEDIEVAL POPULATION (1948), which reached a
smaller number based on less persuasive assumptions about who was listed in medieval tax
records and the size of the household).
88. David Ibbetson, Sixteenth Century Contract Law: Slade’s Case in Context, 4
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 295, 313 (1984) [hereinafter Ibbetson, Sixteenth Century Contract
Law].
89. See id.; PALMER, BLACK DEATH, supra note 30, at 70.
90. BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 36, at 425.
91. See, e.g., Anon., Y.B. 14 Edw. 2, Mich., pl. 25 (1320), reprinted in 104 SELDEN
SOC’Y 86–87 (1988) (granting wager of law as against a sealed tally “because the writing on
the tally can be erased and the notches can be added to and reduced in number as anyone
pleases”); Lecture on Wager of Law, supra note 80, at 214 (“But they may [wage law] in a writ
of debt brought on a simple contract, because it does not lie in the knowledge of the
country.”).
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have made a binding contract (under general or more local customs)
or already paid the debt in private, facts only God and the parties
92
would know. In such a case, if the defendant could not wage his
law, he may have had to pay unjustly or perhaps twice. Business
proceeded at too fast a pace for the law to require certain
93
documentary evidence of every debt and payment. Besides, if a
creditor wished to avoid wager of law, the creditor could always
demand a sealed writing from the debtor. Rather than forcing honest
debtors to document everything, the law accommodated them with
wager of law. This was only possible because of the trusted role that
conscience played in these transactions and dispute resolution
procedures.
Finally, wager of law premised on conscience may have been a
reasonable alternative to a trial by jury. At this time jury trials were
94
quick and risky for the parties (they are still risky). The parties
could not testify, and witnesses may or may not have been reliable or
available. A politically powerful party could influence witnesses or the
95
composition of the jury, or suborn the jurors to perjury. In some
cases, the chief difference between wager and a jury trial may have
been that the defendant rather than the sheriff chose those who

92. BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 36, at 425–26; Ibbetson, Sixteenth Century
Contract Law, supra note 88, at 312.
93. BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 36, at 425. Baker cites Justice Owen for
this proposition. Owen was speaking of conditions near the close of the sixteenth century,
however. Evidence of financial transactions from that time period supports Owen’s assessment.
See, e.g., CRAIG MULDREW, THE ECONOMY OF OBLIGATION (1998).
94. Ibbetson, Sixteenth Century Contract Law, supra note 88, at 312.
95. In Usque v. Bawe, a Chancery case filed after 1397, David Usque pleaded to the
chancellor that William Bawe “is so rich and so strong in friends in the country where he
dwelleth, that the said David will never recover from him at common law, if he have not aid
from your most gracious Lordship.” Reprinted in 10 SELDEN SOC’Y 34, 35 (1896); see also
[Hamelyn v. Isbury] (Ch. 1392), reprinted in 10 SELDEN SOC’Y 48 (1896) (alleging that “the
said John and Thomas [Isbury] are so great in their country in kinsmen, alliances and friends,
that the said suppliant cannot have right against them by any suit at Common Law”); [Badwell
v. Clopton] (Ch. c. 1413–1417), reprinted in 10 SELDEN SOC’Y 111, 112 (1896) (alleging
that “howsoever the said suppliant would sue against the said William Clopton at common
law, he can never come to his purpose, because of the great maintenance of the said William in
those parts”). Sometimes the defendant might threaten the plaintiff sufficiently that he dared
not sue, as in [Palet v. Skipwith] (Ch. 1397), reprinted in 10 SELDEN SOC’Y 33 (1896), in
which Palet alleged that he, “by threats and for fear of the said John Skipwith, . . . did not, and
yet doth not, dare to sue his right thereof.” Palet was not the only one Skipwith, the county
sheriff, frightened. See, e.g., [Rouseby v. Skipwith] (Ch. 1397), reprinted in 10 SELDEN SOC’Y
30 (1896).
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96

would exercise conscience. Moreover, for some debt claims wager
97
of law was not available. In theory, it was not available when the
98
facts would be well-known by prospective jurors. The most
prominent of these instances was debt brought on a written, sealed
99
bond, or debt sur obligacion, examined in Part I.B.4. Even when
wager was available, the defendant could choose to waive his right to
wager and go to the jury. Either way, the consciences of twelve
individuals established the law of the case.
3. Detinue
If the plaintiff alleged that the defendant owed the plaintiff as in
debt, but the plaintiff sought a chattel, the courts considered this a
100
101
case of detinue. Detinue began as a species of debt but developed

96. Defendants did offer to “aver by a jury,” for example, as opposed to swearing
twelve-handed. E.g., Andeburgh v. Anon. Y.B. 14 Edw. 2 (Eyre of London 1321), reprinted in
86 SELDEN SOC’Y 344, 345 (1969) (“aver by a jury” [“averrer par pays”]).
97. Wager was unavailable when debt was brought by a common laborer compelled to
work when requested under the Statute and Ordinance of Laborers, 23 Edw. 3 (1349) (Eng.);
25 Edw. 3, Stat. 2 (1350–51) (Eng.); 34 Edw. 3, cc. 9–11 (1360–61) (Eng.); Sloufort’s Case,
Y.B. 3 Hen. 6, fol. 42, Pasch., pl. 13 (1425), reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 215; Anon.,
Y.B. 39 Hen. 6, fol. 18, Mich., pl. 24 (1460), reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 217.
Wager was also not available in cases of debt for arrears of rent. Baker v. Anon., Y.B. 11 Hen.
4, fol. 79, Trin., pl. 21 (1410), reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 232 (dicta); FLETA, supra
note 23, bk. 2, ch. 63, at 136, reprinted in 72 SELDEN SOC’Y 209 (H.G. Richardson & G.O.
Sayles eds. and trans., 1953) (c. 1290).
98. See, e.g., Anon., Y.B. 2 Edw. 2 (c. 1310), reprinted in 19 SELDEN SOC’Y app. 1, pl.
4 , at 196 (1904), also reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 265 (“BEREFORD [CJ]. Now God
forbid that he should get to his law about a matter of which the country can have knowledge,
for then with a dozen or half-a-dozen rogues he might swear an honest man out of his
goods.”); Galewey v. Margerye, Y.B. 1 Hen. 6, pl. 3 (1422), reprinted in 50 SELDEN SOC’Y
12, 13 (1933) (“Rolfe [for the plaintiff]: if a man declares, and it appears by his declaration
that the country had notice, [wager of] law does not lie.”); Lecture on Wager of Law, supra
note 80, at 214. The theory of wager at various times allowed its usage outside of any action.
For example, wager could be available to show that a defendant was “not summoned
according to the law of the land.” Saltere v. Toltham, 3–4 Edw. 3 (Eyre of Northamptonshire
1329), reprinted in 97 SELDEN SOC’Y 425 (1981); Anon., Y.B. 5 Edw. 2 (1311), reprinted in
63 SELDEN SOC’Y add. cases, pl. 93, at 273 (1944); Anon., Y.B. 5 Edw. 2 (1311), reprinted in
63 SELDEN SOC’Y add. cases, pl. 94, at 273 (1944).
99. Wager was not available in debt on a sealed bond because the bond was a public act
that could be reviewed by a jury. See supra note 74. The same was true in covenant after a deed
was required. Id.
100. See BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 32, at 441.
101. The debt writ quoted above, supra note 62, required an allegation that the
defendant owes (debet) and unjustly detains (“iniuste deforciat”), GLANVILL, supra note 40,
bk. 10, ch. 2, at 116, or “injuste detinet,” Statute of Wales, 12 Edw. 1, c. 6, sec. 6 (1284)
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its own characteristics that caused later generations to classify it
102
separately. Detinue came to be used in place of debt sur contract
for transactions in which one party agreed to convey a specific
103
104
chattel, such as a horse or a specific lot of wool or grain, or to
105
hold bonds in escrow, or otherwise retain and then return certain
106
legal documents. Otherwise, the action was the same as other
species of debt: the item sought was to be named, and the action was
subject to wager of law in some cases and not in others, as with cases
107
of debt on a contract. When the action was not subject to wager of
108
law, the defendant would go to the jury. Thus, as in cases of debt
sur contract, disputes in detinue were resolved by the consciences of
either the defendant and compurgators or the jury.
4. Debt sur obligacion
When a plaintiff pleaded that the defendant was indebted to the
plaintiff as the result of a written bond which the defendant had
sealed (called a specialty or deed), the king’s justices called this a case
of debt sur obligacion. Wager of law was, in principle, not appropriate
in debt sur obligacion because the defendant’s deed publicly resolved

(Eng.). In the detinue version of the writ, the plaintiff alleged only that the defendant unjustly
detains (iniuste detinet) a specific chattel.
102. See MILSOM, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 54, at 262–65.
103. Clifford v. John, Y.B. 14 Edw. 2 (Eyre of London 1321), reprinted in 86 SELDEN
SOC’Y 351 (1969).
104. See, e.g., Statute of Wales, 12 Ed. 1, c. 6, sec. 6 (1284) (Eng.) (sacks of wool).
Anon., Y.B. 14 Edw. 2 (Eyre of London 1321), reprinted in 86 SELDEN SOC’Y 345, 346
(1969) (holding that a complaint for two acres of wheat should have been brought in detinue),
explains that debt lies only for fungible things “which can be numbered, such as money, or
weighed, such as wool; or measured, such as a quarter of wheat and such like.”
105. Bonds held in escrow would be considered a bailment. E.g., Somerville v. Anon.,
Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 50, Hil., pl. 27 (C.P. 1410), reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 269.
106. Note, Y.B. 10 Edw. 4, Pasch. 21 (1470), reprinted in 47 SELDEN SOC’Y 79 (N.
Nielson ed., 1930 [1931]) (detinue for a deed wrongfully retained).
107. Compare FIFOOT, supra note 37, at 28–30, with supra text accompanying notes 97–
99.
108. See, e.g., Tunstal v. Dore, 3–4 Edw. 3 (Eyre of Northamptonshire 1329), reprinted
in 97 SELDEN SOC’Y 404 (1981) (detinue of charters, to the jury); Anon., Y.B. 14 Edw. 2
(Eyre of London 1321), reprinted in 86 SELDEN SOC’Y 349 (1969) (detinue of chattels, to
wager of law); Hungrye v. Drake, Y.B. 14 Edw. 2 (Eyre of London 1321), reprinted in 86
SELDEN SOC’Y 350 (1969); London v. Garton, Y.B. 14 Edw. 2, rep. 2 (Eyre of London
1321), reprinted in 86 SELDEN SOC’Y 140–41 (1969), also reprinted in B&M, supra note 35,
at 266–67.
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all doubts as to the defendant’s indebtedness. As in all debt cases,
damages still had to be liquidated, so not all contractual promises
were directly remediable through this form of action. But from the
110
mid-1300s, debt sur obligacion became the form of action of choice
for the enforcement of formal promises. This occurred when the
courts endorsed recovery in debt sur obligacion of penalties promised
in a sealed, conditional bond called a penal bond. In a penal bond,
the promisor promised to pay a certain penalty unless he completed a
certain performance desired by the promisee. Any kind of
performance could become the condition of a penal bond. A.W.B.
Simpson gives the following example:
Suppose Hugo proposes to lend Robert £100. Robert will execute
a bond in favour of Hugo for a larger sum, normally twice the sum
lent, thus binding himself to pay Hugo £200 on a fixed day; the
bond will be made subject to a condition of defeasance, which
provides that if he pays £100 before the day the bond is to be
111
void.

The bond stated clearly that the defendant owed the plaintiff the
112
penalty sum of £200; the bond was an admission of indebtedness.
Usually the condition was written (endorsed) on the back of the
113
bond. Hugo would deliver the money and Robert would deliver
the bond to Hugo. If Robert did not pay the £100 on the day
appointed, Hugo would sue him in debt sur obligacion for £200.
Though the bond in this example involved what would otherwise be
a contractual promise to pay money disguised as a condition of the
bond, a promise for any kind of performance (to convey land, to
perform a service, to build, etc.) could become the bond’s condition.
Therefore, all kinds of formal contractual promises could, with some
forethought, become enforceable in debt sur obligacion by means of
this kind of bond. Although theoretically a deed could form the

109. Lecture on Wager of Law, supra note 80, at 214.
110. See, e.g., PALMER, BLACK DEATH, supra note 30, at 69–91.
111. A.W.B. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY AND LEGAL HISTORY 114 (1987) [hereinafter
SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY].
112. E.g., SIMPSON, HISTORY, supra note 31, at 88 (transcribing an example from 1510,
which uses the words “teneri et firmiter obligari”).
113. Id.; PALMER, BLACK DEATH, supra note 30, at 79–89 (describing the legal
developments in the 1350s and 60s that led to the widespread use of penal bonds).
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ground for an action of covenant, the debt action offered procedural
114
advantages not relevant here.
Thus, the debt form of action of one kind or another dominated
the contract enforcement landscape of medieval English law: debt sur
contract for informal promises and debt sur obligacion for formal
promises. After penal bonds became generally enforceable in the
fourteenth century, their popularity grew. In late medieval and
Tudor Renaissance England they provided the basis for more
contractual litigation in the royal courts than any other form of
115
contract. As a consequence, debt sur obligacion became the most
common contractual action.
Part of debt sur obligation’s popularity resulted from the
defendant’s lack of effective defenses. The defendant might try to
show that the deed was itself invalid—not a deed at all, or not
116
delivered, or invalid because the condition had been performed, or
a forgery, or “that he had been tricked into executing it because he
117
was illiterate and the contents had been misread to him.” The deed
could also be invalidated for duress, but this defense was limited to
118
cases of “imprisonment and threats of serious personal injury.”

114. In covenant, the plaintiff had to plead the defendant’s breach. In debt, the
defendant had to plead performance of the condition as a defense. If default was shown, the
debt plaintiff could have judgment for the liquidated sum pleaded as the debt, but the
covenant plaintiff would then have to prove damages to the jury. Additionally, some
improvements in procedure, which applied to debt and not to covenant, were introduced into
personal actions in 1352. In covenant, the jury may have credited the defendant’s substantial
performance of the condition, but in debt the liquidated amount was due in full unless the
condition had been fully performed. IBBETSON, supra note 38, at 29–30 & n.24; see also
SIMPSON, HISTORY, supra note 31, at 117, 134; PALMER, BLACK DEATH, supra note 30, at
64–72.
115. SIMPSON, HISTORY, supra note 31, at 112; BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY,
supra note 32, at 368.
116. See, e.g., Langeleye v. Hameldon, Y.B. 12 Edw. 2, Pasch., pl. 8 (1319), reprinted in
70 SELDEN SOC’Y 120, 120–23 (1951) (holding that performance of the condition was a valid
defense, if it could be proved before a jury, to an action on a conditional deed in which the
condition was to return a law book that the defendant had borrowed).
117. BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 32, at 369; SIMPSON, HISTORY,
supra note 31, at 98–99. On being tricked, see Prior of Dunstable v. Smyth, Y.B. 1 Hen. 6,
Mich., pl. 7 (1422), reprinted in 50 SELDEN SOC’Y 23 (1933) (holding that defendant’s plea
that (i) “he is a layman and does not know how to read” and (ii) what was read to him is not
what the deed now presented by the plaintiff says was a good plea). The defendant in Kent v.
Trailly, Y.B. 12 Edw. 2, Hil. 11, reprinted in 70 SELDEN SOC’Y 23 (1951), successfully took
to a jury the question of the deed’s validity by alleging that he was a minor when he had signed
it.
118. IBBETSON, supra note 38, at 72–73; SIMPSON, HISTORY, supra note 31, at 99.
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Lack of capacity was also an invalidating defense, if, for example, the
119
defendant was a married woman or a monk. But if the deed was
120
valid—a proper question for a jury —then the deed could not be
121
For example, in
contradicted and the defendant had to pay.
122
Glaston v. Abbot of Crowland, a 1330 case illustrating the strength
of a valid deed, the defendant gave the plaintiff an unconditional
bond. Later, the defendant paid the obligation in exchange for the
plaintiff’s giving the bond back. Afterward, the plaintiff stole the
bond from the defendant and sued the defendant on the bond. The
court allowed the plaintiff’s suit to continue notwithstanding the
defense of prior payment and that the plaintiff had stolen the bond
123
The valid deed itself in the plaintiff’s hands was the
back.
124
obligation. The formal deed was thus considered to resolve all
litigable issues in advance. Later jurists justified this conclusion on
the ground that the deed’s formality forced its maker to deliberate
125
before consenting to it. The result was that disputes common in
119. SIMPSON, HISTORY, supra note 31, at 98.
120. See, e.g., Clarel v. Aldewyncle, 3–4 Edw. 3, Hil. (Eyre of Northamptonshire 1330),
reprinted in 98 SELDEN SOC’Y 568, 570 (1981) (jury called in response to the plaintiff’s plea
that an acquittance was “not our deed”); Neville v. Botereux, 3–4 Edw. 3 (Eyre of
Northamptonshire 1329), reprinted in 97 SELDEN SOC’Y 498 (1981) (acquittance deed’s
validity determined by a jury).
121. In William Basset’s Executors v. Prior of the Hospitallers, 3–4 Edw. 3, Hil. (Eyre of
Northamptonshire 1330), reprinted in 98 SELDEN SOC’Y 582 (1981), for instance, the
acquittance showed that £30 had been paid in satisfaction of a debt of £100. The court gave
judgment to the defendant, therefore, because the plaintiff was not allowed to contradict his
deed.
122. 3–4 Edw. 3, Hil. (Eyre of Northamptonshire 1330), reprinted in 98 SELDEN SOC’Y
665 (1981), also reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 252.
123. Id.
124. IBBETSON, supra note 38, at 21 (reporting from a fifteenth-century notebook: “Ista
verba in scripto, obligatum essee, faciunt scriptum essee pro causa rei obligate,” which Ibbetson
translates as, “if the words of obligation are used in the writing, then the writing itself is the
cause of the obligation”); SIMPSON, HISTORY, supra note 31, at 95 (“the instrument was the
obligation”).
125. Deeds were rationalized this way in the early modern period. E.g., Sharington v.
Strotton, Plowden 298, 309, 75 Eng. Rep. 454, 470 (Q.B. 1565), reprinted in B&M, supra
note 35, at 488, 491. In this case, Bromley and Plowden argued for the defendants:
[W]ords . . . pass from men lightly. But where the agreement is made by deed there
is more stay. For when a man passes something by deed there is first the
determination of the mind to do it, and thereupon to cause it to be written, and
that is one part of the deliberation, and then to put his seal to it, and that is another
part of the deliberation, and thirdly he delivers the writing as his deed, and that is a
consummation of his resolution. And by the delivery of the deed from him who
made it to him to whom it is made, he gives his assent that he parts willingly with
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other forms of action did not arise in debt sur obligacion. When
disputes did arise, they went to the jury to be resolved on
conscience.
5. Account
126

Account was also a prominent action. In account, auditors—
selected by the parties if they could agree or by the court if they
could not—examined the transactions of the parties to determine
whether one owed the other. During the first part of the late
medieval period, auditors were formal, official, and had authority to
127
commit the party found owing in an account to debtors’ prison.
Though many actions for an account involved parties in feudal
relationships rather than contractual ones—a manorial lord and his
128
bailiff, or an infant and his guardian in socage —the parties might
also have been merchants and their receivers, in which case the
129
action was more contractual. If the accounting was formal, or the

the thing contained in the deed to him to whom he delivers the deed; and this
delivery is like a ceremony in law, plainly signifying his good will that the thing in
the deed should pass from him to the other. Thus there is great thought and
deliberation in the making of deeds, and therefore we receive them as a final tie of
the party and adjudge them to bind the party without thinking what cause . . . there
was for making it.
126. See B&M, supra note 35, at 289–95 (listing leading cases); MILSOM,
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 54, at 275–82.
127. Statute of Westminster II, 13 Edw. 1, c. 11 (1285) (Eng.); S.F.C. MILSOM, Account
Stated in the Action of Debt, in STUDIES, supra note 70, at 133–44.
128. MILSOM, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 54, at 278–80.
129. See, e.g., Anon., Y.B. 11 Edw. 2, Hil., pl. 41 (1318), reprinted in 61 SELDEN SOC’Y
264 (1942), also reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 289, 290 (requiring that the plaintiff
aver that the defendant received money from the plaintiff “for our common profit, to trade or
to spend, or [as] . . . [his] common receiver”); Anon. v. Richard, Y.B. 12 Edw. 2, Trin., pl. 3
(1319), reprinted in 81 SELDEN SOC’Y 57 (1964) (employing a definition of receiver that
included one who had collected money from a purchaser on behalf of a seller of goods, and
rejecting the suggestion that debt was the proper action); MILSOM, FOUNDATIONS, supra note
54, at 280–81. The account action could also remedy what might be called a breach of trust or
unjust enrichment. In Taillour v. Atte Medwe, Y.B. 14 Edw. 2, Mich., pl. 12 (1320), reprinted
in 104 SELDEN SOC’Y 39 (1988), the plaintiff alleged that a testator left him money but that
because plaintiff was underage the executors had given the money to the defendant to keep for
the plaintiff. An account action was held appropriate, even though no status-based relationship
or agreement existed between the parties, because “otherwise [the defendant] would be
answerable to nobody and this would be against the law.” Id., reprinted in 104 SELDEN SOC’Y
39, 41 (1988) (Stonore, J.). The defendant was not allowed wager of law because the money
had been given him by a non-party, so a witness was available to testify to its receipt. Id.
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130

receivership had been created by deed, there was no general way to
131
plead a defense to an action for an accounting. One could not
plead “no accounting” and then wage law in that case. But if the
plaintiff alleged that the receivership was created in private, the
receiver might allege that he was not the receiver and wage law on
132
this issue. For this reason, plaintiffs conventionally alleged that the
receivership had been publicly created at the hand of a non-party in
133
order to force the issue to a jury.
An accounting, if it occurred, might show that one party owed
the other. The auditors would resolve disputes of fact on the same
134
principles as the court: by wager of law for things done in secret
135
and by finding facts themselves for things that could be known. If
the auditors found an amount owing, they would commit the debtor
to prison until the debt was paid. Wager of law was unavailable in

130. E.g., Coleman v. Marham, Y.B. 14 Edw. 2 (Eyre of London 1321), reprinted in 86
SELDEN SOC’Y 353 (1969) (requiring a defendant receiver to answer when it was shown that
the receivership was created by the defendant’s deed).
131. MILSOM, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 54, at 281.
132. Anon., Y.B. 14 Edw. 2 (Eyre of London 1321), reprinted in 86 SELDEN SOC’Y 147,
148 (1969); Braund v. Friday, Y.B. 7 Edw. 2, Pasch., pl. 6 (1314), reprinted in 39 SELDEN
SOC’Y 104 (1922); Lecture on Wager of Law, supra note 80, at 214 (“For instance, in a writ of
account brought against a man supposing that he was his receiver by his own hands, he may
wage his law.”); S.J. Stoljar & L.J. Downer, Commentary on Selected Cases, in 104 SELDEN
SOC’Y, at xi–xiv (S.L. Stoljar & L.J. Downer eds., 1988).
133. See, e.g., Taillour, 104 SELDEN SOC’Y at 39 (discussed supra note 129); Beaumont
v. Kydale, Y.B. 12 Edw. 2, Pasch., pl. 18 (1319), reprinted in 70 SELDEN SOC’Y 146, 146
(1951) (“Malberthorpe. We demand the account in respect of the moneys that you received by
the hand of others; so we cannot be a party to the wager of law etc., since we were not a party
to the contract.”); see also Bastenthwayt v. Lenebane, Y.B. 12 Edw. 2, Pasch., pl. 62 (1319),
reprinted in 70 SELDEN SOC’Y 53, 53–54 (1951) (sending to the jury the issue of whether
defendant was plaintiff’s receiver regarding money he had received from a third party);
Lovekyn v. Weston, Y.B. 12 Edw. 2, Pasch., pl. 54 (1319), reprinted in 70 SELDEN SOC’Y 45–
47 (1951) (sending to a jury the issue of whether defendant was plaintiff’s bailiff); Oxford v.
Baillard, Y.B. 12 Edw. 2, Mich., pl. 6 (1318), reprinted in 65 SELDEN SOC’Y 7, 7–8 (1946);
Perton v. Tumby, Y.B. 10 Edw. 2, Pasch., pl. 15 (C.P. 1317), reprinted in 54 SELDEN SOC’Y
109 (1935), also reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 289; MILSOM, FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 54, at 281–82.
134. E.g., Beaumont, 70 SELDEN SOC’Y at 147. In this case, Bereford, C.J., wrote,
If he demanded the account against you as his bailiff, could you wage your law that
you did not receive the profits of his manor? (He implied that he could not.) Nor
can you here, for the main point of this matter is that you were his receiver, and that
is an office as much as bailiffship, and is open to the cognisance of the country. And
when you come before the auditors you will then be able to answer as you do now,
and discharge yourself.
135. MILSOM, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 54, at 275–76.
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that case as to the debts themselves, because the auditors’ formal
136
decision was a matter of public record. But if the accounting was
informal and the auditors not official, as was the case in the later
medieval period, the accounting resulted in a viable action in debt,
137
138
and the debtor could call on a jury or wage law. In any event, all
decisions in the action of account and resulting debt action were
made by the parties’ choices, by the auditors’ or jury’s factual
findings, and by wager of law. Disputes were resolved according to
the consciences of the parties, the auditors, the jury, or the
defendant and his compurgators.
6. Assumpsit
An alternative existed to the forms of action noted thus far.
Breach of promise might have been tortious, especially in cases
where the promisor performed his promise so badly that the
promisee was harmed by the promisor’s misconduct. That seemed to
medieval jurists to be a trespass, or a wrong in the sense of Matthew
6:14: “[F]orgive men their trespasses.” During the medieval period
the chancery issued writs to remedy such mis-performance of
contractual duties, though these writs were at first limited to
139
contracts made by those in certain kinds of occupations. The
allegation in the writ came to be that the defendant had undertaken
to perform certain things and then had done them badly. In the
sixteenth century, the Latin word for “undertook,” assumpsit,
became the name for this new action grounded on undertakings.
Assumpsit seemed naturally to cover breach of promise because one
could undertake to do a thing by promising to do it.
136. See Baker v. Anon., Y.B. 11 Hen. 4, fol. 79, Trin., pl. 21 (1410), reprinted in B&M,
supra note 35, at 232 (“When he was found in arrears before duly appointed auditors, he was
debtor as it were of record against which he could not wage his law.”); Lecture on Wager of
Law, supra note 80, at 214; MILSOM, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 54, at 277.
137. [Launcher v. London], Coram Rege Roll, m. 72, Mich., No. 566 (K.B. 1402),
reprinted in 88 SELDEN SOC’Y 128 (1971) (following such a procedure), rev’d on other
grounds, 88 SELDEN SOC’Y at 130 (1971).
138. STUDIES, supra note 70, at 133–34.
139. See, e.g., [Asser v. Bradmor], Coram Rege Roll, m. 48, Trin., No. 577 (K.B. 1405),
reprinted in 88 SELDEN SOC’Y 162 (1971) (suit against a leech); [Birchester v. Lewis the
Leech], Coram Rege Roll, m. 53, Hil., No. 515 (K.B. 1390), reprinted in 88 SELDEN SOC’Y
63 (1971); PALMER, BLACK DEATH, supra note 30, at 169–213 (citing assumpsit writs issuing
from Chancery 1350–1382 against carriers, builders, doctors, shepherds, clothworkers, and
laborers); IBBETSON, supra note 38, at 43–56 (listing cases from 1303 onward in which this
was attempted).
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In order for assumpsit to become a more general contractual
remedy, it would have to remedy pure non-performance as well as
mis-performance. In fact, the fourteenth century chancery began to
issue writs ordering (and pleaders began to plead for) a remedy for
140
non-performance of a promise. These writs, though at first surely
successful, were later rejected by the royal courts on the ground that
141
mere non-feasance of a promised performance was not a tort. It
142
was, rather, a breach of covenant
and had to be proved by
143
specialty—a written, sealed agreement. Still, these writs continued
144
to issue throughout the end of the medieval period. It stands to
reason that litigants would not have paid for chancery to issue them
if they were not effective in some way. Most likely the writs’ very
issuance persuaded some litigants to settle, but the medieval holding
that non-feasance was not a tort stopped the assumpsit action from
coming to remedy breach of promise in general. So though some
breaches of promises at this time were remedied or at least forced to
settlement by means of assumpsit, most were not. Those that were
began as a writ issued by the chancellor as a matter of conscience
and, if disputed, were, like all trespass cases, resolved by a jury
according to conscience.
C. Summary: Conscience as Law
When all was said and done in the fragmented medieval contract
law dispute resolution system, someone’s conscience became the law.
The judges enforced agreements, whether by specific performance
(covenant), damages (covenant, debt, detinue, and assumpsit), or by

140. PALMER, BLACK DEATH, supra note 30, at 178 & n.24 (carriers), 181 n.1 (builders
from 1303), 183 & n.8 (builders), 207 nn.50–51 (bakers).
141. See B&M, supra note 35, at 378–401; Baker, Introduction to REPORTS OF JOHN
SPELMAN, supra note 43, at 262–75; SIMPSON, HISTORY, supra note 31, at 250–64; MILSOM,
FOUNDATIONS, supra note 54, at 323–28; S.F.C. Milsom, Not Doing Is No Trespass: A View of
the Boundaries of Case, 1954 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 105–17, reprinted in STUDIES, supra note 70, at
91.
142. In fact, courts sometimes referred to assumpsit writs as covenant. E.g., Stratton v.
Swanlond, Y.B. 48 Edw. 3, fol. 6, Hil., pl. 11 (1374) (Cavendish, J.), reprinted in B&M,
supra note 35, at 360, 361.
143. Baker, Introduction to REPORTS OF JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 43, at 262–63.
144. MILSOM, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 54, at 324; S.F.C. MILSOM, Reason in the
Development of the Common Law, in STUDIES, supra note 70, at 149, 160–61.
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committing the debtor to prison (early account). If enforcement
could rest squarely on the promisor’s assent to enforcement (as in
late covenant and debt sur obligacion), no dispute arose. In such a
case, “agreement prevails over the law,” as the author of Glanvill
146
wrote, and no law was necessary. But when disputes made law
necessary, enforcement depended on conscience. Then either the
oaths taken by the defendant and his compurgators or the decision
made by the jury according to the customs of the people and in
agreement with the jurors’ oaths would end the litigation (as in early
covenant, debt, detinue, account, and assumpsit). Thus, all factual
and many of what we would today call legal questions were resolved
by an oath sworn to God. Either the juror’s act of conscience or the
defendant’s and his compurgators’ act of conscience became law for
the dispute. The litigants preferred this resolution to allowing the
judges to create substantive rules. If a difficult legal issue arose when
the lawyers were discussing the plaintiff’s debt claim for the first
time, the defendant would opt to wage his law or go to a jury—go
to conscience—rather than risk a judicial decision against him;
147
lawyers opted not to force the courts to decide legal questions.

145. Under the Statute of Merchants, 13 Edw. 1 (1285) (Eng.), merchants’ debtors who
defaulted on an officially recorded debt could be imprisoned immediately and made to pay the
debt while in prison by sale of their chattels or lands.
146. GLANVILL, supra note 40, bk. 10, ch. 14, at 129 (“conuentio legem uincit”).
147. This kind of “tentative pleading” (this is Maitland’s term, F.W. Maitland,
Introduction to 20 SELDEN SOC’Y, at lxvii (F.W. Maitland ed., 1905)) is the subject of most
Yearbook reports. The purpose of medieval pleading, which was done orally, was to reach an
issue that could be sent to trial. In the course of the pleading discussions, counsel would
suggest pleas that might have ended the litigation had the judges ruled on them. But the
judges declined to rule and instead warned counsel that his argument was probably not well
taken. Then counsel would back off and try something else. Finally, if the judges gave him no
help, counsel would fall back on some sure plea that he knew would get him to trial, in
contract law either wager of law or the jury.
For instance, in Dunman v. Weldon, 3–4 Edw. 3 (Eyre of Northampsonshire 1329),
reprinted in 97 SELDEN SOC’Y 476 (1981), also reprinted in B&M, supra note 35, at 210,
Dunman brought debt for grain worth 100s against Weldon, alleging that the defendant
refused to make delivery. Elmdon, counsel for Weldon, answered in response that Weldon did
not sell any grain and does not withhold any, and elected to wage his law. Justice Scrop, in
response, warned, “If you were to be received to wage your law in this case, it would have to
be upon the receipt of the money, for the receipt is the cause of the indebtedness. . . .
Therefore take heed, at your peril, whether you wish that as your answer.” B&M, supra note
35, at 211. When Elmdon again answered this way, Scrop questioned him again, “Do you
want the averment?” Id.
Essentially, Justice Scrop was suggesting that Elmdon do something else: aver some
specific fact that would undercut the debt claim rather than state as he had and rest on his
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Greater particularity in rules of contract did not develop during this
period largely because, when difficult questions arose, someone
would swear, and the swearing ended the matter.
Little if any remedy existed for breach of the oath, given attaint’s
ineffectiveness in controlling juries and the lack of any general crime
148
of or remedy for perjury. “Perjury” stems from Latin peiero, “to
swear falsely.” Perjury, like marriage law, fell within the jurisdiction
of the ecclesiastical courts. So, if one wanted to contest a decision of
conscience in common law contract litigation, one might end up in
the church courts, though a common law court would have
prohibited that transfer of jurisdiction if a defendant purchased from
149
the chancery and prosecuted a writ of prohibition to that effect. If
one was dissatisfied with the common law’s dependence on oaths in
the late medieval period, one could always begin contract litigation
in the church court in the first place, where much of it actually took
150
place then, or in the chancery, where contract litigation was also

election to wage law. Then the Yearbook reporter says, “Elmdon did not dare to abide by
wager of law, and put forward the averment that he sold the plaintiff no grain and received no
money . . . .” Then Justice Scrop explained where Elmdon’s mistake would have led had
Elmdon insisted on making it. Scrop saw a denial of the sale and a denial of withholding the
grain as inconsistent, because there was no need to deny withholding unless the plaintiff had a
right to some grain. If Elmdon denied withholding the grain, then the court would “take the
sale of the grain and receipt of the money as conceded,” id., a finding that would warrant
judgment for the plaintiff in this case in which only damages were sought. But rather than let
Elmdon harm his client’s case thus, the court instead drove him to deny only the sale and
receipt of money and instead go to a jury. The court took his pleading as tentative. That
meant, of course, that the court never ruled on whether Elmdon’s tentative plea actually
doomed his client’s case. Justice Scrop thought it would, and wise counsel would probably
take that warning into account in the future when pleading, but there is no definite ruling.
Because the tentative plea was withdrawn by counsel, the plea never made it into the record of
the case or further discussions by the judges. One consequence is that there was no
opportunity to discuss further the substantive point at issue—why the court thought a defense
based on non-withholding was inconsistent with and should trump a defense based on nonsale of the grain and why the non-withholding defense was ineffective. A jury could perhaps
examine whether goods were withheld (they were either visible to the public or they were not),
but could never know for sure whether Dunman had paid. Possibly this decision rests on
Justice Scrop’s preference for jury trial over wager. We will never know, because Elmdon’s
escape foreclosed any need to discuss the matter further.
148. There was no common law of perjury. A statute passed in 1487, 3 Hen. 7, c.1
(Eng.), reprinted in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 26, at 509, gave power to the Star
Chamber to examine and punish perjuries. A later statute, 5 Eliz., c. 9 (1562–63) (Eng.),
reprinted in 4 STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 26, at 436–37, first made perjury a crime.
149. Baker, Introduction to REPORTS OF JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 43, at 66–67 & n.8.
150. See, e.g., HELMHOLZ, CANON LAW, supra note 27.
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conducted under the nose of the Episcopal Chancellor. Either way,
a decision would have been rendered consistently with what the
ecclesiastical judges or the chancellor thought conscience demanded.
There was no way to avoid conscience as law.
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CONSCIENCE AS LAW
To the historian, one of the most obvious consequences of the
litigation-stopping oath was that what resolved the medieval
contracts cases is never made explicit in the legal record. The
conclusion that some legal historians draw from this—now as a
truism—is that there was no law, or as Ibbetson says, putting it more
152
mildly, the law was “fuzzy.” Ibbetson’s teacher, Baker, complains,
Systems of justice which depended on general oaths . . . had no
need of pleading in any refined sense; God could not be
interrogated. God would choose between the parties, but He could
not be told the rules to apply or asked to reveal His reasons. Divine
intervention by its nature stopped short of finding facts or making
153
law.
....
. . . [I]n actions of debt on a contract, defendants invariably
pleaded the general issue and often waged their law; for centuries
this unchanging procedure prevented questions about the law of
contract from being asked. The medieval law of debt was a law of
procedure and little more, because it was a survival of the ancient
154
pattern of lawsuit.

And Baker’s teacher, Milsom, disparaged medieval jurisprudence:
[T]he persistence of wager in the action of debt was not just a
symptom of social backwardness: it seems also to have been a cause
of the retarded intellectual growth of that branch of the law. The
legal historian trying to reconstruct the substantive law finds many
elementary questions that he cannot answer, and the reason turns
out to be because the facts raising them would not be specially
pleaded but subsumed under Nil debet [the general plea in defense,

151.
152.
153.
154.

See, e.g., BARBOUR, supra note 31, passim.
IBBETSON, supra note 38, at 12.
BAKER, ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 32, at 84.
Id. at 96; see also id. at 367.
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“I owe nothing,” after pleading which the defendant could wage
his law]. If the defendant wages his law, it was in his conscience
that the rule sought actually operated. And when the historian has
realized this he ought to ask—and one at least must confess that he
has not always done so—how far a rule on the matter could have
had definite existence. . . . [W]ithin this framework, the matter
would emerge into the light of legal discussion only if an opinion
155
were sought on the propriety in conscience of wager.

Milsom’s point is vividly illustrated by the variety of rules that
our law has expressed but which medieval law did not: rules for
requiring objective from subjective assent, what is an offer or
acceptance, when an offer can no longer be accepted, what to do
when material terms are omitted, whether the offeree must know of
the offer, standards for acceptance, when acceptance can be by mail,
how contracts are entered by form (U.C.C. § 2-207), the
156
effectiveness of part payment in settlement of debts,
illusory
promises, frustration of purpose, mistake, unconscionability, good
faith as a condition of performance, anticipatory breach, and
damages. Reliance on the oath, with other influences, stopped
medieval contract law from developing explicit rules for these issues.
But Milsom’s criticism is a criticism only if one has a certain
157
conception of law. To a large extent it is a positivist conception:
that the law must be (a) posited and (b) recognizable as law because
158
of something other than its content. Simpson persuasively argues
that this view of the common law is incorrect. First, he claims that
the common law is recognizable as law because of its content—not
159
as a result of some other rule or factor.
The doctrine of consideration is a good example of Simpson’s
160
point. It became law in the Tudor period. If the historian traces
consideration back, the original reason for its existence appears to be
that defense counsel in a case in 1539 objected to the plaintiff’s
155. MILSOM, Law and Fact, supra note 70, at 171, 174.
156. See generally MILSOM, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 54, at 256.
157. Milsom in fact implies that law might exist but not as an intellectual system. See
MILSOM, Law and Fact, supra note 70, at 188 (discussing “law as an intellectual system”).
158. A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, reprinted in SIMPSON, LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 111, at 359, 362–64. Simpson was arguing not with Milsom, but rather
with Austin, Hart, and Kelsen. Simpson’s criticisms hold as to Milsom’s comment as well.
159. Id., reprinted in SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY, supra note 111, at 366–68.
160. Simpson uses the parole evidence rule similarly. Id., reprinted in SIMPSON, LEGAL
THEORY, supra note 111, at 368.

1026

RIC-FIN2

993]

2/5/2004 4:41 PM

Contract Law and Christian Conscience

bringing a debt case in assumpsit grounded on the defendant’s
other, later promise to pay the debt. (Of course, the case could have
been brought in debt, but the plaintiff preferred assumpsit.) The
subsequent promise was an undertaking, but it was also a mere
promise, and nowhere in the forms of action was a mere informal
oral promise enforceable. Alleging a cause or consideration for the
subsequent promise would have defeated that entirely formal
objection, allowing the plaintiff to continue to bring the debt case in
161
From there the allegation of a consideration in
assumpsit.
assumpsit was later generalized. But courts quickly forgot the
original, formal reason for the requirement. No court remembers it
today. And no court requires a consideration today simply because
the requirement was laid down in the time of Henry VIII, or even
because its state reception act requires that English common law be
followed. The consideration requirement remains law because of its
content, in spite of its spurious history. It is the primary guard
against enforcing mere gift promises. Alternately, the primary
ground for enforcing promises may actually be reciprocal exchange.
This law is law because of its substance, not because it was once
recognized as law.
But the law need not even be posited. Eventually something
must be left unspoken in the law and its practice. Simpson refers to
rules
governing the proper use of authority and the reverence due it.
One moment the House of Lords or the Court of Criminal Appeal
is absolutely bound by its own decisions, and the next moment it is
not. . . . And what is the authoritarian pecking order between a
decision of the American Supreme Court, dicta by the late Scrutton
L.J., and an article by Pollock? There are no rules to deal with
162
conundrums of this sort.

But the law resolves such conundrums anyway, and practitioners
act despite the absence of guiding rules. What guides them is not
written—not proved to be law. Lawyers so guided are thus moved by
a kind of faith, a “substance of things hoped for,” in Paul’s words.

161. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, Origins of the “Doctrine” of Consideration, 1535–1585, in
BAKER, LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 36, at 369, 371–74; Ibbetson, Sixteenth Century
Contract Law, supra note 88, at 143.
162. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY, supra note 111, at 369.
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Philip Bobbitt addresses the same difficulty in contemporary
163
jurisprudence. Bobbitt’s first book, Constitutional Fate, described
modes of argument—textual, historical, structural, doctrinal,
prudential, and ethical—that the American practice of constitutional
164
law recognizes as legitimate. The use of these forms of argument
legitimates constitutional positions taken by the U.S. Supreme
165
Court. Bobbitt’s thesis focuses on constitutional law, but the
modality method he describes is only a variation of the common law
166
method of practice, as Dennis Patterson has shown. Bobbitt’s
description of legal practice, however, came with an inherent
167
difficulty (a criticism Bobbitt later acknowledged): “Constitutional
Fate . . . does not remotely offer a way of choosing among the six
legal-grammatical modalities that Bobbitt discusses . . . . When, for
example, one concludes that history and doctrine, or text and
prudence lead to conflicting results, Bobbitt does not in fact present
168
a hierarchy that allows resolution.”
This criticism is the same positivist assertion Simpson argued
against: that the law—that which guides the judge—must all be
posited. Against Bobbitt’s description of legal practice, the criticism
takes the form that the legitimating modes of argument themselves
contradict each other. No scale or metric exists to guide choice
169
between the modes of argument; they are incommensurable. So
judges are left without guidance.
170
Both Simpson and Patterson resort to custom to solve this
problem of incommensurability. “We need,” Simpson writes, “to
conceive of the common law as a system of customary law, and
163. See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991)
[hereinafter, BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION].
164. See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982).
165. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 163, at 6–22.
166. DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 128–82 (1996) (demonstrating that the
common law considers four modes of argument legitimate: textual, historical, doctrinal, and
prudential; the specific categories of argument are not as vital as the common law’s modal
nature).
167. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 163, at xiv.
168. Sanford Levinson, The Audience for Constitutional Meta-Theory (Or, Why, and to
Whom, Do I Write the Things I Do?), 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 389, 398 (1992).
169. See, e.g., Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: An Introduction, 146 U. PA.
L. REV. 1169 (1998) (defining “incommensurability” thus).
170. See PATTERSON, supra note 166, at 163–82. Patterson moves out beyond the forms
of argument to the beliefs and assumptions that support them, but he maintains that
“normativity arises from linguistic practices.” Id. at 179 (emphasis added).
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recognize that such systems may embrace complex theoretical
notions which both serve to explain and justify past practice . . . and
171
provide a guide to future conduct in these matters.”
He
emphasizes the system as custom because he sees law as including the
practice of law, as opposed to mere propositions of law or
propositions about it. In this way, Simpson avoids the positivist
critique. Simpson relatedly claims that part of law practice is never
spoken (not positive), even as a form of argument. In a passage
reminiscent of Wittgenstein, Simpson implies that the common law
doctrines and Bobbitt’s forms of argument are subordinate to the
practice itself:
Formulations of the common law are to be conceived of as similar
to grammarians’ rules, which both describe linguistic practices and
attempt to systematize and order them; such rules serve as guides
to proper practice since the proper practice is in part the normal
practice; such formulations are inherently corrigible, for it is always
possible that they may be improved upon, or require modification
172
as what they describe changes.
....
When there is disagreement within a customary system there
must, if the system is to function, be some way of settling at a
practical level which view should be acted upon . . . . This problem
is solved by procedures . . . . If agreement and consensus actually
173
exist, no such rules are needed . . . .

Under this description, legal rules themselves, and the forms of
argument, are mere grammar to encourage those within the legal
practice to do what they ought. That means by implication that parts
of legal practice exist beyond the legal rules and forms of
174
argument. In fact, practitioners know that such practice exists,
because some of these meaningful but unspoken practices are

171. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY, supra note 111, at 375–76.
172. Id. at 376.
173. Id. at 380.
174. On this point, Patterson’s book waffles. Patterson suggests that agreement stops
what would otherwise be an infinite regress of argument. PATTERSON, supra note 166, at 174.
And he agrees with Simpson that “persuasion . . . drives choice,” id. at 145, as if being
persuaded ended argument also. But Patterson never explains what happens when a person is
not persuaded.
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occasionally given voice. For instance, lawyers often simply take for
granted a kind of taxonomy of law that remains unstated: “Divorce is
not a tort”; “Breach of contract is not a crime”; “The government
cannot tell you whom to marry.” Moreover, the response to some
pro se litigants’ arguments is often to speak the previously unspoken.
Non-lawyers make shocking arguments in court. Judges rejecting
those arguments often state reasoning they have never heard stated
175
anywhere but with which all or most lawyers would agree. A third
example includes claims lawyers decide not to bring and arguments
they decide not to make. Unmade arguments are absurd sometimes
not because of any specific written law but because the lawyer simply
knows that no judge would allow them. These discarded arguments
reflect the unspoken practice of law. And even these statements, once
spoken, are not absolute law in any realist sense. A decent lawyer
could easily think of a situation in which “divorce is not a tort”
might be contested and held (or rejected) by our highest courts. But
the practice itself would survive even though the propositions, one
by one, all changed. In a very real sense, legal practice—the lawyer’s
form of life—is a priori of any specific, speakable rule, including any
176
interpretation of or obedience to them.
But the unspoken part of the lawyer’s form of life cannot be
merely custom, particularly for the Christian lawyer. Custom is
morally neutral with regard to itself. It cannot judge itself good or
ill. If the law is to serve God’s purposes, movement toward that end
must come from somewhere besides the custom of lawyers.
Simpson suggests that the law might improve internally.
Certainly, Simpson notes, common lawyers believed that “if only the
matter was considered long enough and with sufficient care a
177
uniquely correct answer could be distilled for every problem.” The

175. Occasionally, judges just reject them out of hand. See, e.g., May v. Kennard Indep.
Sch. Dist., 1996 WL 768039 (Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate
Judge, Nov. 22, 1996) (rejecting some of a pro se litigant’s pleadings as “largely incoherent,
conclusory, ambiguous, and reflect[ing] no comprehension of the limited and actual
jurisdiction of the federal courts”). But sometimes basic misunderstandings about the pro se
litigant’s rights must be corrected. Id. (“Plaintiff asks the court to perform legal research for his
benefit on a designated issue of state law. This motion should be denied because the court is
not a dispensary of free legal research for litigants.”).
176. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS §§ 201–202 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1958).
177. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY, supra note 111, at 377–78. This belief is reflected in the
words of Coke, who called the common law an
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common law was also committed to rationality. In the small, closedoff group of common lawyers, the “common reason of the
178
profession” was the source of law, or it was the law itself. This
belief of common lawyers was overly optimistic if taken only as
Simpson describes it. Nothing in this common reason or procedure
guarantees either rationality or improvement in the law. Agreement
179
No other method or resource
stops debate, rational or not.
Simpson describes tests the assumption that a uniquely correct
answer can actually be distilled. When the practice does not solve the
problem, and the procedures reveal disagreement about basic ideas
and values, how does one test new practices and procedures? And
what is a judge to do—how is the individual judge to decide what to
do—in a situation where a procedure such as majority rule is
supposed to solve the problem facing the court? Simpson never
answers this question, probably because he is concerned primarily
with responding to positivist criticisms of the common law, and
positivism itself never addresses the normative question the lawmaker
180
must face. Thus, the difficulty with Simpson’s account is that one
is not sure what will count as an improvement or worsening of the
common law, or how this is to come about. Had Simpson written a
full account, he surely would have included the role that conscience
played in the common law. When a difficult problem presented itself,
the medieval judges in fact often declined to resolve it. Instead, they
left the problem to the conscience of the litigant or sent it to a jury
artificial perfection of reason, . . . by many successions of ages . . . fined and refined
by an infinite number of grave and learned men, and by long experience grown to
such a perfection, for the government of this realm, as the old rule maybe justly
verified of it . . . : No man out of his own private reason ought to be wiser than the
law, which is the perfection of reason.
Coke on Litt. 97b (1628).
178. See, e.g., J.H. BAKER, English Law and the Renaissance, in BAKER, LEGAL
PROFESSION, supra note 36, at 461 (explaining the medieval judge’s view of his reasoning
process in these terms); Baker, Introduction to REPORTS OF JOHN SPELMAN, supra note 43, at
159–63 (similarly explaining Renaissance views of judging). The more that sort of common
practice breaks down—and it has been breaking down now for several hundred years—the
more we turn to authority to establish legal rules. E.g., SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY, supra note
111, at 380.
179. SIMPSON, LEGAL THEORY, supra note 111, at 380. Simpson’s way is one way to say
this. That rationality has its limits is another. See generally PIERRE SCHLAG, THE
ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998) [hereinafter, SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT].
180. Hart famously said that the judge must make “something in the nature of a choice.”
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127 (2d ed. 1994). Hart considered the moral
influences on the judge’s decision to be extra-legal. Id. at 155–212.
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for resolution according to the jury’s conscience. Difficult questions
in medieval contract law were questions of conscience, to be resolved
by those actors close to the situation and able to see what should be
done. Later common law judges undertaking to answer questions
formerly left to juries and defendants waging law surely would have
recognized that they too were making a decision of conscience.
Perhaps not too surprisingly, when addressing similar
contradiction and incommensurability problems in his second book,
Constitutional Interpretation, Bobbitt reaches much the same
conclusion as medieval jurists. Bobbitt answers that contradictions
181
and incommensurabilities are resolved according to conscience.
How fitting that a postmodern commentator would adopt the
182
Although not particularly unique, Bobbitt’s
premodern term!
conclusion merits discussion here because he uses the word
“conscience” to describe it.
Just what Bobbitt means by “conscience” is not entirely clear at
first glance. He does not mean a moral or philosophical theory that
183
answers the open-ended questions ahead of time. Such a theory
would then replace legal practice, speakable and unspeakable, as the
184
source of legitimation of legal decisions and sacrifice the pluralism
185
that decisions between incommensurables make possible.
Conscience must therefore mean something else, a non-theoretical
186
187
morality: “individual moral sensibility,” “moral choices,” “moral
188
189
judgment,” and “a mastery of the art of deciding.”
Patterson criticizes Bobbitt on this point: “What is missing in
Bobbitt’s otherwise compelling account of the practice of
constitutional law is some description of the practice of
190
persuasion . . . .” Stated another way, conscience is private—“a
181. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 163, passim.
182. But perhaps it is not that unusual. Schlag notes modernity’s obsession with reason
and posits that reason in the law is itself unsupportable by reason and amounts to mere belief.
SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 179, at 40–125.
183. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 163, at 142–54.
184. Id. at 158–59.
185. Book Note, Legitimacy and Justice in Constitutional Interpretation, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 1218, 1219–20 (1993).
186. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 163, at 168.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 170.
189. Id.
190. PATTERSON, supra note 166, at 145.
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But is it? Wittgenstein illustrated the
conversation stopper.”
192
impossibility of private language. Anything truly private about
conscience, Wittgenstein would say, “has no place in the language193
game at all.” Only our social or public practices play a role in the
meaning of words. So to criticize conscience as private is to assert
that the word has no meaning. Surely that criticism falls of its own
weight.
Alternately, Patterson may be claiming that the private aspect of
conscience’s grammar may render a judge’s assertion of it immune to
criticism. Certainly, we are sometimes hesitant to criticize another’s
assertion of conscience. But other words have an equally private
194
195
196
“pain,”
“understanding,”
dimension:
“knowledge,”
197
198
“intention,” “imagination,” and even “persuasion,” the word
Patterson finally uses. A grammar of privacy applies to each of these,
but that does not mean we cannot evaluate assertions of each of
them. In fact, Patterson’s persuasion is almost just as indescribable as
conscience—full of will, morality, dogma, tradition, and faith as well
199
as reason.

191. Gene R. Nichol, Book Review, Constitutional Judgment, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1107,
1115–16 (1993); PATTERSON, supra note 166, at 144 & n.70.
192. Patterson of course recognizes this rather famous argument of Wittgenstein’s.
Dennis Patterson, Book Review, Conscience and the Constitution, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 270,
303–05 (1993); PATTERSON, supra note 166, at 144 n.72.
193. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 176, § 293.
194. See id. §§ 148–91.
195. See id. §§ 246, 251, 253, 289, 310, 403–09, and pt. II, at 189.
196. See id. §§ 138–54, 321, 396, 532.
197. See id. §§ 247, 641–50.
198. Id. §§ 397–402, 512.
199. The “web” of truth Patterson sees in Quine clearly includes choice, as Quine
describes it. PATTERSON, supra note 166, at 159 (quoting W.V.O. QUINE, Two Dogmas of
Empiricism, in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20, 43 (1953)). Patterson tries to reduce
choice to persuasion to the result of argument: “Conscience does not persuade, nor is it
persuaded: only argument can do that.” Id. at 146 n.80. I am tempted to say that Patterson
cannot have it both ways: Either it is choice, via Quine, or it is forced by argument. But the
matter is more complicated than that, as Patterson well knows. That he has set out a grammar
of persuasion, quite a persuasive one, still leaves it just a grammar for a practice not wholly
contained within it. Though Bobbitt’s “art of deciding” may be objectionably too subjective a
term to describe what actually goes on, still some part of persuasion is not argument. Even if
we grant that humans as sensory beings may be merely a “blank” with no choice but to be
impressed by the die of empirical fact, id. at 169, a characterization with which I disagree, still
not all argument comes with the force of factual experience, and certainly legal argument does
not, especially in the difficult cases Bobbitt is trying to discuss.
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Bobbitt understands that conscience is not a conversation
stopper and not wholly private, which is why he holds that
200
201
202
conscience can be educated as a kind of “art” or “judgment.”
It is why conscience may be “corrupt and ill-informed,”
203
“anesthetize[d],” renewed, and cultivated. Bobbitt in fact equates
204
It is, without much more, a “way of
conscience with faith.
It is telltale that Patterson uses United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193
(1979), as an example of a case in which persuasion supposedly could have solved the issue.
Patterson praises Justice Blackmun for combining doctrinal and prudential argument in such a
way as to avoid the modality conflict posed in the majority opinion. PATTERSON, supra note
166, at 64–67. Patterson also praises Eskridge for reworking statutory interpretation
(dynamically) so as to legitimate Weber under a modified form of historical argument. Id. at
176–79. These are supposed to be instances in which persuasion is at work. But even the
judges in Weber were not persuaded by Justice Blackmun’s position, which is why it is only a
concurrence in which no one else joined. 443 U.S. at 209. It was not persuasive to the very
judges to whom it was addressed. Eskridge’s reworking of Weber was not published until 1987,
long after Weber was decided, so it did not help the judges either. Even had it been published,
there is no guarantee that it would have convinced the majority any more than Blackmun’s
concurrence did. Nor is it any guarantee that courts or anyone else should be persuaded by it
now. See, e.g., In re Hospitality Associates of Laurel, 212 B.R. 188, 201 n.14 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1997) (rejecting Eskridge’s position). This is empirical evidence that persuasion is not merely
the result of argument. Persuasion is not the result of mere choice, either (Quine’s word is also
reductive). But persuasion sometimes means both of these. And clearly habits and the art of
decision-making may play a role.
But often persuasion contains a good deal of faith, too, in the simple sense of hope for the
as-yet unseen, as Paul puts it in Hebrews 11:1. The unseen may be that I will not later come to
disagree with this decision, or that I will not lose the respect of those I respect, or that I really have
considered every angle, or acceptance of the decision by others, or that no slippery slope results, or
that the lower courts do not mangle this, and so on, and from Quine’s web, that I am not holding
this legal statement “come what may” or that my “adjustments” necessary to make it are not too
“drastic.” PATTERSON, supra note 166, at 159 (emphasis added) (quoting QUINE, supra, at
43). All of these are unknown, hoped-for unseens when a decision comes down. Giving
judgment in such a case is an act of faith, or persuasion and faith, or persuasion and choice. I
might describe it in a number of ways. But not everything can be settled when the tough
decision must be made. Common usages of persuade bear family relationships to many other
words. To say that none of these others except persuade are proper in describing the work of
judges is to depart from ordinary usage and even privilege one rather reductive usage of
persuade itself.
200. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 163, at 179 (“Does this mean we can be
educated to do better, make wiser and more just decisions? Yes . . . .”); id. at 184 (“The
cultivation of our constitutional traditions requires . . . the cultivation of our
consciences . . . .”).
201. Id. at 170, 183 (quoting Charles L. Black, who in turn quotes Coke’s name for law:
“artificial reason,” see supra note 177), 186.
202. Id. at 178.
203. Id. at 184.
204. Id. at 185–86; Philip C. Bobbitt, Barbara Jordan: Constitutional Conscience, 5 TEX.
J. WOMEN & L. 171, 172–73 (1996) [hereinafter, Bobbitt, Barbara Jordan]. Bobbitt talks
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living.” Obviously, such a thing is hard to describe, probably
impossible to describe. Each description seems to destroy what else it
might be or become. But if the meaning of a word is its use in the
206
language — and words must be used by someone in order to have
meaning—then the need for the word must be prior to its use and
meaning, and something of human life must be in a sense a priori of
language, even in law. These other non-language or less-language
forms of life are meaningful, too. They can be talked about, but they
cannot be spoken. They are not done by speaking. Our ability to say
how to do them is therefore limited. But the meaning of our
language is bound up with them. Our participation in them is what
gives our words meaning. Pointing this out is perhaps the now near207
truism of the postmodern insight. It is true in law as elsewhere.
This postmodern insight leads us back to the medieval contract
law problems left to the jury’s and litigant’s oaths. Both the medieval
and the postmodern lawyer are comfortable with a theory that does
not answer every question in the law. Neither is concerned that the
decisionmaker cannot fully articulate a justification for his decision
theoretically. The postmodern lawyer finds such articulation
impossible. Both see the need for acting without proof of the path
ahead, acting on conscience, acting on “the substance of things
hoped for, the evidence of things not seen,” as Paul describes faith.

about “the still, small voice of conscience.” Id. at 172. “It sounds preachy” to talk about
conscience. Id. at 173. Law with conscience calls “on our devotion.” Id. Philip Bobbitt, Parlor
Game, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 151, 153–54 (1995) (“The success of the American
constitutional enterprise . . . needs faith and, if the word is not inappropriate, reverence . . . .”).
On the connection between Patterson’s persuasion and faith, see supra note 199.
205. Bobbitt, Barbara Jordan, supra note 204, at 172.
206. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 176, § 43.
207. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, An Exchange on the Nature of Legal Theory: Theory
Minimalism, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 761, 767 & passim (2000); see also SCHLAG,
ENCHANTMENT, supra note 179, at 68–75 (conveniently listing excerpts from Nietzsche,
Gadamer, Foucalt, Derrida, Lyotard, and Deleuze and Guattari that make this point);
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 176, § 23 (“the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a
form of life”), § 206 (“The common behaviour of mankind is the system of reference by means
of which we interpret an unknown language.”). With Fish this insight takes the rhetorical form
that our practices are contingent and socially constructed:
It may seem counterintuitive, but your awareness, even knowledge, that the routines
you are running and the evidentiary procedures you rely on and believe in are
features of a contingent and revisable practice, of a practice that is, as they say,
“socially constructed,” will in no way erode the confidence with which you run
those routines or generate that evidence.
Fish, supra, at 767.
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For the medieval, the act of conscience on the litigant’s or juror’s
oath is enough; for the postmodern, the act of the judge on
conscience is enough.
Of course, to some this assertion is either “intellectually
retarded,” in Milsom’s words, or not “making law,” as Baker claims.
208
209
Both Bracton
and Fleta
speak poignantly against the first
accusation. Neither was intellectually retarded. Nor were the authors
210
of the Yearbooks. Surely some explanation other than intellectual
retardation must be given for reliance on conscience. Surely the
medievals must have seen the exercise of conscience speak truth, for
it to merit such trust.
The second accusation, subversiveness of law itself, can be
attributed, remarkably, to Thomas More. More once accused the
English judges of cowardice for refusing to impose real law on the
populace, preferring instead to place on juries and litigants
211
responsibility for the results of cases. He urged them to take on
issues directly and create rules. He trusted the conscience of his fellow
highly educated, wealthier judges, but not the conscience of the jury.
More’s was a Renaissance position, at the end of the age of faith.

208. BRACTON, supra note 23. Samuel E. Thorne, Bracton’s most competent and
thorough translator to date, opined that Bracton wrote of English law “with the confidence
and mastery one would expect of an English justice expounding the law he himself
administers.” S.E. THORNE, Henry De Bracton, 1268–1968, in ESSAYS IN ENGLISH LEGAL
HISTORY 76, 80 (1985). Thorne called Bracton “a great book worthy of careful study.” Id. at
91.
209. FLETA, supra note 23, reprinted in 72 SELDEN SOC’Y (H.G. Richardson & G.O.
Sayles eds. and trans., 1953) (c. 1290). Thorne called Fleta “the poor man’s Bracton.”
THORNE, supra note 208, at 78. Fleta was to some extent redacted from Bracton but also
reorganized the material into a coherent arrangement and updated it. G.O. Sayles,
Introduction to FLETA, supra note 23, bks. 5 & 6, reprinted in 99 SELDEN SOC’Y, at xiv–xx
(G.O. Sayles ed. and trans., 1983).
210. See, for example, the Yearbooks themselves, published consecutively each year for
most of the middle and late medieval period (English translations for some Yearbooks are
available from the Selden Society, the Ames Foundation, and in the Rolls Series). The
Yearbooks were afforded such respect during the sixteenth century that Edmund Plowden
suggested that creating them was official government work. EDMUND PLOWDEN, THE
COMMENTARIES, OR REPORTS OF EDMUND PLOWDEN, at iv–v (Paternoster-Row 1816)
(1571). Plowden’s suggestion has been discredited, J.H. Baker, Records, Reports and the
Origins of Case-Law in England, in JUDICIAL RECORDS, LAW REPORTS, AND THE GROWTH
OF CASE LAW 23–25 (John H. Baker ed., 1989), but the arguments made by lawyers of
Plowden’s time (as recorded in Plowden’s Reports) reflect the high esteem in which the
Yearbooks were held.
211. WILLIAM ROPER, THE LYFE OF SIR THOMAS MOORE, KNIGHTE 45 (Elsie Vaughn
Hitchcock ed., 1935) (1555).
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Similarly, some Renaissance writers sought actually to express the
dictates of conscience. Most prominent in England is Saint Germain’s
212
Doctor and Student, which attempts to reconcile conscience and the
213
common law, or in some cases say where they differ. Saint Germain
214
describes conscience at length as both synderesis (it “says and
imparts knowledge by itself . . . and is not only cognitive also but motive,
215
and inclines the soul to pursue good and eschew evil”) and the
application of reason to particular circumstances (“an applyenge or an
ordering of any scyence [or knowledge] to some partyculer acte of
216
man”). But then Saint Germain explains at length what rules
217
conscience requires. Of course, once Saint Germain expresses the
requirements of conscience in rule form, no further act of conscience
as he describes it is required with regard to such rules themselves—one
can follow the rule rather than one’s conscience. Thus, by so

212. ST. GERMAN’S DOCTOR AND STUDENT, reprinted in 91 SELDEN SOC’Y at xi (T.F.T.
Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., 1974) (1529–1530).
213. Id., reprinted in 91 SELDEN SOC’Y at 3 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., 1974)
(1529–1530) (“The present dialogue shows what are the principles or grounds of the laws of
England, and how conscience ought in many cases to be formed in accordance with those same
principles and grounds. It likewise discusses briefly the question of when English law ought to be
rejected or not on account of conscience.”).
214. Id., reprinted in 91 SELDEN SOC’Y at 78–95 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds.,
1974) (1529–1530).
215. Id., reprinted in 91 SELDEN SOC’Y at 87 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds.,
1974) (1529–1530).
216. Id., reprinted in 91 SELDEN SOC’Y at 89 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds.,
1974) (1529–1530) (square brackets in original). St. Germain also cites other definitions
reminiscent of Bobbitt’s description:
And so it should be known that of conscyence thus taken Doctoures make many
dyscrypcyons/ wherof one doctour (St. John Damascene) saythe that conscyence is the
lawe of oure vnderstandynge. Another that conscyence is an habyte of the mynde
dyscernynge bytwyxt good and euyll. Another, that conscience is the assent or belief of the
intention to do a thing, confirmed by deliberation of the mind. Another that conscyence
is the Jugement of practical reason Jugynge on the patyculer actes of man/ all whiche
sayenges when well resolved agree in one and the same effecte/ that is to saye that they
mean that conscyence is an actuall applyenge of any cunnynge or knowlege to such
thynges as be done/ wherupon it foloweth that upon the moste parfyte knowlege of
any law or cunnynge. And of the moste parfyte and most true applyeng of the same
law or cunning/ to any partyculer acte of man: foloweth the most parfyte the most
pure and the moste beste conscience[.]
Id., reprinted in 91 SELDEN SOC’Y at 89 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton eds., 1974) (1529–
1530).
217. E.g., id., reprinted in 91 SELDEN SOC’Y at 228–33 (T.F.T. Plucknett & J.L. Barton
eds., 1974) (1529–1530) (discussing what the common law, civil law, ecclesiastical law, and
conscience require regarding obligations arising from promises).
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describing conscience, Saint Germain decreased its relevance. We have
long marched down the path Saint Germain trod, until now
conscience plays no formal role in legal analysis. A return is in order.
III. RETURN TO CONSCIENCE
A. The General Christian Jurisprudential Goal: Salvific Freedom
The scriptures present a structure for law in which the role of
faith or conscience is explicitly recognized. At first, only a general,
theoretical purpose for law appears. The verses discussed here bring
me back to the question that began this essay: What does God
expect of contract law? Here the scriptural canon provides some
general but limited guidance regarding what God expects of law in
general and contract law in particular in a society including nonbelievers. The clearest statement from the canon follows:
4 And now, verily I say unto you concerning the laws of the
land, it is my will that my people should observe to do all things
whatsoever I command them.
5 And that law of the land which is constitutional, supporting
that principle of freedom in maintaining rights and privileges, belongs
to all mankind, and is justifiable before me.
6 Therefore, I, the Lord, justify you, and your brethren of my
church, in befriending that law which is the constitutional law of the
land;
7 And as pertaining to law of man, whatsoever is more or less
than this, cometh of evil.
8 I, the Lord God, make you free, therefore you are free indeed;
218
and the law also maketh you free.

In verse 5, the law that is “justifiable” before the Lord is the law
that supports “that principle of freedom.” Verse 4 names the only
“principle” with which the passage is concerned: “that my people
should observe to do all things whatsoever I command them.” So
the law that supports that principle is justifiable and belongs to all

218. Doctrine & Covenants 98:4–8 (emphasis added).
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mankind. “Constitution” is here distinguished from “principle.”
Moreover, the clause beginning “supporting . . .” modifies “law of
the land.” So rights and privileges supporting the principle of
freedom that “my people should observe to do all things whatsoever
I command them” are justifiable.
Because that law is justifiable, “therefore” the Lord (as stated in
verse 6) justifies the Church in befriending “that law.” Both the
word “therefore” and the use of the same word “justified” and
“justify” in verses 5 and 6 limit our befriending to that law which is
both constitutional and supporting of the principle named in verse 4.
The reference to “that law” in verse 6 is to “that law” discussed in
verse 5. Verse 6 does not justify the Church in befriending all
constitutional law. If it had meant to say that, the clause in verse 6
“that law which is” would be redundant.
Substantive legal positions otherwise marked out in theology and
history support the limitation of verse 6 to law supporting “that
principle of freedom.” Some have said that verse 6 justifies our
supporting all constitutional law, but this is not only contrary to the
linguistic suggestions of verses 5 and 6 but also takes too broad a
substantive position. For instance, the Lord does not justify our
befriending constitutional law approving slavery, because slavery
would interfere with the principle of freedom named in verse 4,
which, as verse 5 states, belongs to all mankind. The Lord also does
not justify our befriending constitutional law requiring his people
directly to cease to live by his commands. We can abide by the law
without befriending it.
Verse 7 limits the justification only to law supporting that
principle of freedom: “whatsoever is more or less than this, cometh
of evil.” Verse 7 makes sense theologically because human law is
violence or force against other humans. The Lord would not
condone our committing violence or force generally. Therefore the
law needs some justifying principle, which is why verses 5 and 6 talk
220
in terms of justification. Verse 4 names the principle of freedom
and verse 7 limits the justification to that: law in the service of
freedom. The maintenance of freedom to serve God—or to decide
219. The passage in Doctrine & Covenants 98:5–6 stands in contrast to Doctrine &
Covenants 109:54, in which the Constitution is spoken of as a principle or set of principles.
220. See also Doctrine & Covenants 98:22–32 (especially verses 23, 25, 26, and 30–31,
which recommend peace as a reaction to violence but justify protection of life and to a lesser
extent liberty).
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not to serve him—in all things is consistent with what a God of love
working only for the salvation of his children would recommend.
221
The law “maketh you free.” Any violence God condoned beyond
that would be forced salvation, a contradiction. And God cannot
mean the violence of the state to serve anything other than our
222
salvation, because he has said he does nothing but for our benefit.
It follows then that law is to serve freedom to do the will of God in
all things and, subordinately but necessarily, to decline to serve God.
I call this freedom salvific freedom. It is a precondition of salvation,
including the greater salvation for those who are sanctified and
overcome all things.
223
Several other passages in scripture and in the writings of the
224
prophets make this same point about human law. Probably most
poetically, Paul wrote:
221. Id. at 98:8.
222. See 2 Nephi 26:22 (Book of Mormon); Moses 1:39 (Pearl of Great Price).
223. Doctrine & Covenants 101:77–80; Mosiah 27:1–4 (Book of Mormon); Alma 30:7–
8 (Book of Mormon). The rhetoric of the Christian people in the Book of Mormon (the
“Nephites”) about government centered around peace and equality. The purpose of both was
often described as maintaining salvific freedom. See Val D. Ricks, Abortion and Latter-day
Saint Experience with Children and Law, 2001 MARGINS 523, at 550–52 & nn.84–90
(discussing more fully these and other passages from the canon).
224. See, e.g., 2 HISTORY OF THE CHURCH, supra note 8, at 7 (“The laws of men may
guarantee to a people protection in the honorable pursuits of this life, and the temporal
happiness arising from a protection against unjust insults and injuries: and when this is said, all
is said, that can be in truth, of the power, extent, and influence of the laws of men, exclusive of
the law of God.”); Brigham Young, The Kingdom of God (July 8, 1855), in 2 JOURNAL OF
DISCOURSES 309, 313 (photo. reprint 1956) (1854–1886) (“What is the foundation of the
rights of man? The Lord Almighty has organized man . . . and has given him his individual
agency. Man is made in the likeness of his Creator, . . . who bestowed upon him the principles
of eternity, . . . and leav[es] him at liberty to act in the way that seemeth good unto him, to
choose or refuse for himself.”); Marion G. Romney, America’s Fate and Ultimate Destiny
(May 2, 1976), in 1 CLASSIC SPEECHES 255, 265 (1994) (“To this generation [God] has
given [his laws] anew through his prophet Joseph Smith, Jr. The giving of these laws, however,
would have been abortive without a civil government that would guarantee men the
untrammeled exercise of their God-given free agency.”); Ezra Taft Benson, Address at the
138th Annual General Conference of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (April 6,
1968), in 138 CONF. REP., Apr. 1968, at 49 (“The function of government is to protect life,
liberty, and property, and anything more or less than this is usurpation and oppression.”);
BRUCE R. MCCONKIE, Inalienable Rights, in MORMON DOCTRINE 377 (2d ed. 1966) (“As a
natural and automatic inheritance from their Creator, all men are born into the world with
certain inalienable rights, rights which cannot be surrendered, transferred, or alienated. The
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE lists life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness as among
these. In the full sense they include every natural and inherent right necessary for the working
out of one’s salvation in the kingdom of God. Freedom of thought and of worship, freedom of
speech and of preaching the gospel, freedom to investigate the truth, to worship God
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I urge, then, first of all, that requests, prayers, intercession and
thanksgiving be made for everyone—
2 For kings and all those in authority, that we may live peaceful and
quiet lives in all godliness and holiness.
3 This is good, and pleases God our Savior,
4 Who wants all men to be saved and to come to a knowledge of
225
the truth.

Verse 2 gives a reason to pray for kings: that Christians may seek
salvation. Verses 3 and 4 give another reason: that all men might be
saved and come to a knowledge of the truth. Every person should
226
have the freedom to accept Christ’s gospel and be sanctified by it.
Most relevant to Professor Andersen’s thesis, law conforming to
this prescription would keep us free to make and keep the highest
promises of our faith: the covenants we make with God, and the
227
covenants we make at the altar with God and those we marry. Such
law would also preserve and promote our freedom to keep with
honor our primarily economic promises, as N. Eldon Tanner
228
suggested, even when bankruptcy law might legally discharge our
obligations.
For jurisprudence generally, the most defining aspect of salvific
freedom is the limitation in Doctrine & Covenants 98:7 quoted
previously: “As pertaining to the law of man, whatsoever is more or
less than this, cometh of evil.” This passage makes salvific freedom

according to the dictates of one’s own conscience, to earn a temporal livelihood—these are
among our inalienable rights.”); Dallin H. Oaks, The Divinely Inspired Constitution (July 5,
1987), in THE SPIRIT OF AMERICA 11, 20–21 (1998) (Elder Oaks quotes Doctrine &
Covenants 101:78–80 and then explains, “In other words, the most desirable condition for the
effective exercise of God-given moral agency is a condition of maximum freedom and
[personal] responsibility.”).
225. 1 Tim. 2:1–4 (New International).
226. I read the passage in Romans 13 as consistent with this purpose. The passage in
Romans provides its own limitation: The ruler is “the minister of God to do good.” Rom. 13:4.
The ruler only does good if he acts for the purpose set forth in 1 Timothy. For a more general
discussion of the Romans passage, see Ricks, supra note 223, at 547 n.78.
227. See Andersen, supra note 2, at 842–44.
228. See id. at 829–30 (quoting N. Eldon Tanner, Address at the 136th Semi-Annual
General Conference of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Oct. 1, 1966), in
OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE 136TH SEMI-ANNUAL GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE CHURCH
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS 97, 99 (1966)).
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the overruling theory for Church members’ thought about law. If it
is, then the scriptures mandate a kind of value monism with an
accompanying maximization principle. Just like efficiency is the end
of law and economics, salvific freedom is the end of law and
salvation. This value monism should not surprise us. The canon also
posits that God himself follows in this world a single purpose—the
229
immortality and eternal life of humankind —and gave his life for its
230
maximization. In the decisions of life, salvation is the monistic
value that, in theory, resolves the incommensurables. Salvific
freedom, at least in theory, resolves the legal incommensurables.
As a general matter, salvific freedom as a goal is not controversial
in the greater Christian community. Pope John Paul II wrote in
1991 to explain why the Catholic Church supports a long list of
human rights: “In a certain sense, the source and synthesis of these
rights is religious freedom, understood as the right to live in the
truth of one’s faith and in conformity with one’s transcendent
231
dignity as a person.” And elsewhere: “freedom attains its full
development only by accepting the truth. . . . The Christian upholds
freedom and serves it, constantly offering to others the truth which
he has known . . . , in accordance with the missionary nature of his
232
vocation.” But the insight remains general: the Pontiff refrains
from directing a preference for any institutional solution to the
233
problem of how to bring this freedom about.
The church’s
“contribution to the political order,” he writes, “is precisely her
vision of the dignity of the person revealed in all its fulness in the
234
mystery of the Incarnate Word.”
And Professor Michael McConnell, a Protestant, recently wrote
to affirm that classical liberalism’s roots are connected with Christian
belief in the “ineradicable nature of sin,” the freedom of the church
229. See Moses 1:39 (Pearl of Great Price) (“For behold, this is my work and my glory—
to bring to pass the immortality and eternal life of man.”).
230. See 2 Nephi 26:24 (Book of Mormon) (“He doeth not anything save it be for the
benefit of the world; for he loveth the world, even that he layeth down his own life that he may
draw all men unto him.”).
231. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, Encyclical Letter on the Hundredth
Anniversary of Rerum Novarum, May 1, 1991, at No. 47, available at http://
www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul-ii/encyclicals/documents/hf-jp-ii_enc_01051991.
232. Id. at No. 46.
233. Id. at No. 47.
234. Id.; see also Carmella, supra note 12, at 255, 267 (characterizing the state’s limited
role as protection of freedom consistently with other facets of Catholic social justice).
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from a limited government, and what McConnell calls “primacy of
conscience”—the view that “faith, to be valid and acceptable to God,
235
must be uncoerced.”
Moreover, writes McConnell, “[t]o the
extent that God’s will affects all of life, then the principle of freedom
236
must apply to all of life.” Of course, liberalism has strayed from
these roots. The modern liberal state rejects uncoerced faith in God
237
because the liberal state sees the
as a ground for freedom,
individual self as the goal. Promoting freedom to serve God, on the
other hand, seeks instead “connection to other humans and,
238
ultimately, to a transcendent God.” But liberalism’s promise of
freedom in matters of faith in part prompts McConnell to proclaim:
“Liberalism properly understood is the form of government most
consistent with the gospel, and most conducive to living in harmony
239
with God and our neighbors. We should take it back.”
Identifying salvific freedom as a goal is but a beginning,
however, and necessarily only that. Salvific freedom can do some
work. But pretending that this very abstract idea can resolve all the
difficulties in advance of actual problems is asking too much of it. An
abstraction is just that—it necessarily leaves out details, and its task in
language is usually to explain and compare, not to govern. The
postmodern insight is that the words alone will not solve all the
problems. This is true in other parts of our lives as it is in our legal
life. The hope of salvation does not in this life resolve all difficult
individual moral and spiritual questions, nor do theology and
240
doctrine. Revelation through the Holy Spirit is necessary! We must

235. Michael McConnell, Old Liberalism, New Liberalism, and People of Faith, in
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 10, at 5, 7–13.
236. Id. at 14.
237. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Liberal Hegemony and Religious Resistance: An Essay on
Legal Theory, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 10, at 25;
Elizabeth Mensch, Christianity and the Roots of Liberalism, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON
LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 10, at 54.
238. Carter, supra note 237, at 47–49.
239. McConnell, supra note 235, at 24.
240. John 14–17; Articles of Faith 9 (Pearl of Great Price). One might expect the
postmodern explicitly to mention the possibility of revelation. And indeed Stanley Fish does
refer to revelation. See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Response: Interpretation Is Not a Theoretical Issue, 11
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 509, 511 (1999) (“Or, one can think of intentions as the result of the
Holy Spirit working within you, and believe, as Jeremiah and St. Paul did, that when they
speak it is as the vehicle and sounding board of a higher power (‘Not me, but my master in
me’).”). So does Schlag. See, e.g., SCHLAG, ENCHANTMENT, supra note 179, at 26 (discussing,
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241

learn by study and by faith. Likewise the hope and theory of salvific
freedom do not resolve all difficult questions. The danger is that, all
too human, we will try to resolve in advance what cannot be resolved
in advance. In a legal system based solely on reason, the attempt to
resolve in advance, by system, what cannot be resolved makes reason
look like an empty faith. But if salvific freedom is taken as the guide
and we attempt to make unmakeable decisions in advance, the same
movement will render our faith false. And why should God reveal in
advance how to resolve individual cases? Where would be the
opportunity to employ faith in the exercise of our moral agency? The
parties themselves may yet reach agreement, obviating the need for
revelation of more law. In short, the incommensurables remain
despite the general imperative. Besides, we are not likely to find
much agreement on the content of salvation, let alone salvific
freedom. Disputes about both have led to religious wars. The
disagreement is probably endemic to the human condition; one’s
view of the content of salvation even varies with individual
242
sanctification.
Thus, the Christian seeking to protect and promote salvific
freedom in a specific dispute will often have to proceed without
guidance in the form of rules and without proof that the application
of the principle of salvific freedom is correct. The Christian will have
to exercise faith with regard to an understanding of the requirements
of salvation, the practicalities of meeting them, the needs of life, the
diverse ways in which humans might serve God, and a sense of how
one party’s freedom is best balanced against another’s in order to
promote the ultimate goal. In other words, the Christian will have to
exercise conscience.
B. A Christian Jurisprudence of Contract Law
Those engaged in protecting and promoting salvific freedom and
involved in writing and critiquing contract law must ask how salvific
freedom as a principle helps their task. Certain other passages of
scripture develop the notion of salvific freedom by implying a role
for contract law. But the revelations themselves are of limited help. I
in the process of showing that reason is supported only by reflexive belief in itself, reason’s
rhetorically casting itself as superior to revelation).
241. Doctrine & Covenants 88:118.
242. See id. at 93:27–28.
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wish to stress again that the task here is freedom, not forcing others
to do good works or even to refrain from evil. Although scripture
outlines fairly clearly which approach a disciple of Christ should take
243
in economic matters, the scriptures never mandate that human law
should impose this righteousness on anyone. Freedom to disobey
God by actions that do not infringe inappropriately on others’
freedom to obey him is necessary if any real freedom is to exist. Laws
are ordained, God said, “that every man may act in doctrine and
principle pertaining to futurity, according to the moral agency which
I have given him, that every man may be accountable for his own
244
sins in the day of judgment.” The law is to preserve freedom to do
good and evil. Here, as elsewhere, freedom to serve God or decline
to serve him is the goal.
But there are hints that some contract law is necessary within
law’s ordained role. This is a necessity derived, in one way of looking
at it, from the more clearly established requirement of private control
of some property. In fact, some control of private property is
theologically necessary. Quite simply, God said, “it is not given that
one man should possess that which is above another, wherefore the
245
world lieth in sin.” This sort of equality of property is not possible
unless the Lord’s children are able to give freely to each other
because, otherwise, initial differences in resource potential, be that
natural talent or fertile ground, will exclude equality as such
differences are actualized. And to give freely and know when giving
would be appropriate, one must freely control and be able to convey
to others. Moreover, consecration of that property to God is possible
246
only with stewardship under him, and stewardship of property
entails possession and some free control of it. To make the
righteousness of consecration both significant and possible legally,

243. On this issue, see, for instance, 3 Nephi 26:19 (Book of Mormon); 4 Nephi 1:3
(Book of Mormon); Doctrine & Covenants 49:20; Acts 2:44, 4:32; Leviticus; Deuteronomy;
Hugh Nibley, Work We Must, But the Lunch Is Free, in APPROACHING ZION, 9 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF HUGH NIBLEY 203 (Don E. Norton ed., 1989).
244. Doctrine & Covenants 101:78.
245. Id. at 49:20; see also Moses 7:18 (Pearl of Great Price) (“And the Lord called his
people ZION, because they were of one heart and one mind, and dwelt in righteousness; and
there was no poor among them.”); supra sources cited note 243.
246. We, the human family, are stewards of the earth. God’s words to Adam and Eve so
indicate: “subdue [the earth], and have dominion . . . over every living thing that moveth upon
the earth.” Gen. 1:28. We hold the earth under God, its creator, and are accountable to him
for its use.
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some large percentage of property necessary for people’s needs must
be in private control. Furthermore, the side benefits of private
property also persuade that it is necessary. Controlling the earth’s
247
resources allows one to learn not just consecration but also work
248
249
and planning and the overcoming of greed and covetousness,
250
which are really forms of idolatry. These opportunities to give for
251
the kingdom of God and lay up treasures in heaven sanctify those
252
who take advantage of them.
On the other hand, the freedom to give property to God would
be illusory without the freedom to reject him and use the property
for selfish or other ends. Direct accountability to God for these
activities makes sanctification or its opposite, condemnation,
253
possible. The ability to use property for righteous or selfish ends,
accountable to God alone, is salvific freedom with respect to
property. So when Professor Andersen correctly points out that
254
contract law takes as its paradigm the selfish promise, this might
mean that our law appropriately ensures the right to do some evil, so

247. As to tithing, see, for example, Gen. 28:22 (Jacob’s promising the Lord that “of all
that thou shalt give me I will surely give the tenth unto thee”); Lev. 27:30; Mal. 3:8–12
(expounding the commandment to tithe); Doctrine & Covenants 68:23; Doctrine & Covenants
119:4. As to consecration, see, for example, Acts 4:32–37, 5:1–11; 2 Cor. 8:9–15; Mosiah 4:21
(Book of Mormon); Alma 1:27 (Book of Mormon); 4 Nephi 1:3, 25 (Book of Mormon);
Doctrine & Covenants 19:26 (“I command thee that thou shalt not covet thine own
property . . . .”), 42:30, 49:20, 51:3, 78:5–6, 105:5; Moses 7:18 (Pearl of Great Price).
248. The Lord said to Adam, “[C]ursed is the ground for thy sake.” Gen. 3:17 (second
emphasis added).
249. Exod. 20:17; Deut. 5:21; Rom. 7:7–12, 13:9 (New International) (“Do not
covet.”); Mosiah 13:24 (Book of Mormon); Doctrine & Covenants 19:25, 88:123.
250. Col. 3:5.
251. See Matt. 6:19–21 (“Lay not up for yourselves treasures upon earth, where moth
and rust doth corrupt, and where thieves break through and steal: But lay up for yourselves
treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break
through and steal: For where your treasure is, there will your heart be also.”), 19:21; Mark
10:21, 12:41–44; Luke 12:33–34, 18:22; Helaman 5:8 (Book of Mormon); 3 Nephi 13:19–21
(Book of Mormon).
252. Doctrine & Covenants 78:5–7.
253. See Doctrine & Covenants 104:13–17 (“[I]t is expedient that I, the Lord, should
make every man accountable, as a steward over earthly blessings, which I have made and
prepared for my creatures. I, the Lord, stretched out the heavens, and built the earth, my very
handiwork; and all things therein are mine. . . . For the earth is full, and there is enough and to
spare; yea, I prepared all things, and have given unto the children of men to be agents unto
themselves.”). This revelation is addressed to the Church members of the time, but these
quoted verses 13, 14, and 17 contain a more universal message.
254. Andersen, supra note 2, at 829–30, 832–38, 859–60.
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long as one does not act unconscionably, which should in this
descriptive scheme mean something like depriving another of salvific
freedom.
The scriptures also directly support the view that some right to
control property should exist. Section 134 of the Doctrine &
Covenants declares: “We believe that no government can exist in
peace, except such laws are framed and held inviolate as will secure
255
to each individual . . . the right and control of property.” The
section also identifies theft as a crime to be punished by civil
256
257
government. Israelite government also prohibited theft. And
God has instructed even that those in the Church who steal are to be
258
“delivered up unto the law of the land.” Even when God described
259
the relatively complete law of consecration, he still directed that
260
each member have complete control over his own stewardship.
Additionally, scriptures that discuss the millennial or post-millennial
earth contain descriptions of property distribution that sound much
like private, individual control of the earth’s resources. For example,
Isaiah describes the millennial “new earth”:
They will build houses and dwell in them; they will plant vineyards
and eat their fruit. No longer will they build houses and others live
in them, or plant and others eat. For as the days of a tree, so will be
the days of my people; my chosen ones will long enjoy the works of

255. Doctrine & Covenants 134:2.
256. Id. at 134:8.
257. See Exod. 20:15 (“Thou shalt not steal.”); Lev. 19:11 (“Ye shall not steal . . . .”);
Deut. 5:19. Nephite government likewise prohibited theft. Alma 1:18 (Book of Mormon)
(prohibiting both robbery and theft); Alma 30:10 (Book of Mormon) (prohibiting both
robbery and theft). “Nephite” refers to the Book of Mormon people who identify themselves
both as a branch of Israel and as Christians.
258. Doctrine & Covenants 42:85.
259. See, e.g., id. at 42, 51, 57, 58, 70, 72, 78, 82, 83, 85, 104, 119. Under the more
complete law, Church members were required initially to convey their property to the Church
and then received back from the Church as their own property a stewardship which they then
maintained for their support.
260. See Acts 4:32 (confirming that each believer retained control of “his possessions,”
though she did not call them her own); Doctrine & Covenants 42:32 (“a steward over his own
property, or that which he has received by consecration”) (emphasis added), 51:4–5
(mentioning portion of the stewardship “that is deeded unto” the steward), 83:3 (holding that
after a man died, his wife and children “may remain on their inheritances according to the laws
of the land,” which would have provided that ownership devolved upon heirs or legatees).
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their hands. They will not toil in vain or bear children doomed to
261
misfortune; for they will be a people blessed by the Lord . . . .
262

Truly, the meek will inherit the earth. They should therefore
have a chance to sanctify themselves by consecrating their patch of
earth to the Lord now, in preparation. Thus, affirmation of a right to
263
private property has a solid basis in Christian theology.
But first, each must gain a patch of earth. Because we come to
earth with nothing, some method for obtaining a stewardship is
necessary. In a cohesive, religious society, earthly blessings could be
distributed by commandment or by inheritance. This was done in
264
265
ancient Israel, and among the Nephites to an extent. It could

261. Isa. 65:21–23 (New International); see also id. 2:4 (“they shall beat their swords into
plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks”), 57:13 (“he that putteth his trust in me shall
possess the land, and shall inherit my holy mountain”), 60:21 (“Thy people also . . . shall
inherit the land for ever . . . .”), 61:4–5 (“And they shall build the old wastes, they shall raise
up the former desolations . . . . And strangers shall stand and feed your flocks, and the sons of
the alien shall be your plowmen and vinedressers.”); Matt. 5:5 (“Blessed are the meek; for they
shall inherit the earth.”); Doctrine & Covenants 38:20 (“[Y]e shall have it for the land of your
inheritance, and for the inheritance of your children forever, while the earth shall stand, and ye
shall possess it again in eternity.”), 45:58 (“And the earth shall be given unto them for an
inheritance . . . .”), 101:101 (“They shall build, and another shall not inherit it; they shall
plant vineyards, and they shall eat the fruit thereof.”).
262. See Pss. 25:13 (“[H]is seed shall inherit the earth.”), 37:9 (“those that wait upon the
Lord . . . shall inherit the earth”); Matt. 5:5 (“Blessed are the meek; for they shall inherit the
earth.”); 3 Nephi 12:5 (Book of Mormon) (same as Matt. 5:5); Doctrine & Covenants 29:23–
25, 59:5–20, 63:19–21, 77:1, 84:100–01, 88:17–20 (“For after [the earth] hath filled the
measure of its creation, it shall be crowned with glory, even with the presence of God the
Father . . . .”), 88:25–26, 103:7, 130:9. Also notice Revelation 21:1–3, wherein John the
Beloved wrote:
And I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth were
passed away . . . . And I John saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down from
God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a
great voice out of heaven saying, Behold, the tabernacle of God is with men, and he
will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with
them, and be their God.
263. Consider also, for instance, the counsel of Pope John Paul II, who writes that “the
principle task of the State is to guarantee . . . individual freedom and private property.” Pope
John Paul II, supra note 231, at No. 48; see also George E. Garvey, A Catholic Social Teaching
Critique of Law and Economics, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT, supra
note 10, at 224, 238 (“Catholic social teaching . . . favors private-property rights . . . .”).
264. Num. 26:52–56 (“And the Lord spake unto Moses, saying, Unto these the land
shall be divided for an inheritance . . . .”); Num. 34–35 (Moses’ dividing of the land between
the tribes); Deut. 2:5 (the Lord’s instructing Israel not to meddle with the land of Seir
“because I have given mount Seir unto Esau for a possession”); Josh. 13 (Joshua’s dividing the
land of Canaan among the people at the Lord’s command).
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perhaps be done today if humankind were willing to abide by God’s
266
267
commands. But they are not. Moreover, preservation of freedom
not to accept the Lord’s will requires a method of obtaining property
268
other than by the Lord’s command or by inheritance. The need for
some other method of obtaining stewardship is, for me, at least one
clear reason for some law of contract. Contract is a method of
obtaining stewardship consistent with salvific freedom. A law of
contract thus augments a stewardship/property regime. Contract law
should allow us to barter our natural assets—labor, most obviously—
for other things. Also, sometimes the best stewardship of property is
to trade it for something the steward can make better use of. And
without a law enforcing promises, transaction costs involved in
trading labor for other goods may well be too high to make such a
transfer profitable enough to meet the stewardship needs of the
population. So a law of contract assists and encourages everyone’s
269
stewardship. In a sense, it effectively brings the future—one’s
future labor, for instance—within the stewardship/property regime.
(There may be other reasons for contract law consistent with the
Lord’s general purposes, but these are sufficient for the purpose of
this discussion.)

265. See, e.g., 3 Nephi 21:22 (Book of Mormon) (the Lord’s giving the Nephites land in
America “for their inheritance”); Alma 27:22 (Book of Mormon).
266. See, e.g., Doctrine & Covenants 38:18–20 (the Lord’s promising a land of
“inheritance” to his disciples in nineteenth-century America).
267. The Latter-day Saints of the mid-nineteenth century were not prepared to accept an
inheritance from the Lord because of sin. Id. at 101:2–8, 103:4, 103:8. See also Andersen,
supra note 2, at 859 n.94. The enemies of the Latter-day Saints were also not prepared to let
them inherit the land in peace. See, e.g., Doctrine & Covenants 103.
268. This technically is why Church ownership of property would not serve the Lord’s
purpose of securing and maintaining freedom to be sanctified. The Lord’s children must be
free to reject the Lord, and they could not do this freely if earthly resources were obtained only
by inheritance from the Church. The need to choose God for money would then prevent the
Lord’s children from coming to him for love.
269. Experience in the last century at least has shown that the kind of intricate planning
and high-level risk coordination necessary for the best stewardship also requires a law of
contract or promise enforcement. See, e.g., Simon Johnson et al., Courts and Relational
Contracts, SSRN Working Paper No. 4338-02 (Feb. 2, 2002) (concluding with respect to
various economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union that “development of legal
institutions . . . brings indirect efficiency gains, by lowering entry barriers, in addition to direct
efficiency gains through strengthening confidence in contracts”). Whether this kind of contract
law is viewed as promise enforcement, private law, or property in future labor or otherwise
does not matter for this theory. Maximization of salvific freedom sees it as control of resources,
and any of these labels could be made to work as well as any other.
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C. A Continuing Role for Conscience
Beyond
the
limited
extent
of
augmenting
a
stewardship/property regime, the scriptures seem to be mostly
abstract regarding contract law. Absent more explicit direction, the
inevitable generality of the goal of salvific freedom brings us back to
the necessary role of conscience, which reappears as contract law
descends from the general to the specific and contradictions and
seeming incommensurables also reappear. Our law places
incommensurables differently than did medieval law. In the medieval
period they were questions of fact for the parties and jury, to be
resolved according to conscience. But the particularity of our
common law rules, compared with medieval law, forces a shift of
some of these questions away from the parties and jury and asks the
judiciary to answer them. Alternatively, this drive for particularity
imposes on a legislature a similar task. In contract law, paternalism
that protects parties against bargaining weakness or unfairness or
hard bargains underlies our doctrine of unconscionability, named
thus because it is a direct legal descendant of the English chancellor’s
270
On the other hand, the desire to
jurisdiction in conscience.
facilitate exchange and protect an ethos of self-reliance underscores
the notion that bargains should be enforced. When a new case arises
on the border between these two paradigms, is it one of
unconscionability or of a bargain whose adequacy—or inadequacy—
271
the law chooses not to judge? Cases going either way arise all the
time, and various forms of arguments can be used to legitimate a
decision either way on such facts. In the end the judge is not
compelled to choose either option.
Such borderline cases are of course not limited to
272
unconscionability. They appear in every corner of contract law, and
deciding them moves the law in one direction or another.
Unfortunately, in these particular cases salvific freedom as an idea is
of limited use. Sometimes there is no a priori or speakable method of

270. KEVIN M. TEEVEN, A HISTORY OF THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON LAW OF
CONTRACT 314–18 (1990).
271. This difficulty in contract law is of course that pointed out by Duncan Kennedy in
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
272. So Professor Andersen notes: “Social conscience manifests itself in numerous ways,
such as in the principles and doctrines of unconscionability, illegality, avoidance of forfeiture,
and good faith.” Andersen, supra note 2, at 852.
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determining what we should do. No practice of law guides us, and
the issue is truly new. That is a moment of moral agency, as Bobbitt
says, and conscience, something unproved, guides us.
Other ways exist to describe where we turn in that moment
besides “morality” and “conscience.” Pierre Schlag calls them
“theoretical unmentionables,” and makes a list of them:
“pragmatism, practical reason, good judgment, discretion, and
273
balancing.”
I think they are better called “theoretical
indescribables,” and Schlag is right that they all play a similar role in
the architecture of legal thinking. Bobbitt at least freely admits the
moral component that is surely there or will be there for those who
care about doing what is right. Schlag is also right that “nothing
274
positive can be said about them.” They are indefinable. That is
their theoretical virtue, but it is also their truth. I would say it this
way: In situations in which one would turn to a theoretical
unmentionable for answers, the moral agent stands unmediated by
legal practice before God and must make a decision. One would not
expect it otherwise, in this life. “We are incapable of making
something that will obviate (rather than suppress) the requirement
275
for moral decision.” This is merely an agnostic’s restatement of the
(also true) converse of Abraham 3:25: “We will prove them
herewith, to see if they will do all things whatsoever . . . God shall
276
command them.” That is one of the meanings of our existence. So
in that moment the honest judge acts out of conscience. There is
nothing else to do.
Schlag, probably correctly, notes that few if any will be
comfortable with reliance on a not fully speakable conscience or with
faith in a God who must be known through continuing revelation.
“Just tell me what to do,” most will say. The uncomfortable will try
to avoid the uncertainty and the moral decision in a variety of ways:
God is no doubt the all-time champion theoretical
unmentionable. . . . [Such] unmentionables will generally work fine
until one of three things happens: 1. Somebody actually tries to say
something about the structure and content of these theoretical

273. PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL MIND 89 (1996) [hereinafter SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW].
274. Id.
275. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 163, at 186.
276. Abraham 3:23 (Pearl of Great Price).
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unmentionables, . . . in which case they become theoretically very
mentionable. They require a positive content, a structural identity,
and thus become subject to the very same contradictions that
caused their parent discourse to produce them in the first place. Or,
2. Somebody points out that these theoretical unmentionables
really are unmentionable and that accordingly, their explanatory
power is, . . . well, somewhat limited. Or, 3. The theoretical
unmentionables are renamed and perhaps even reconceptualized in
a way that the original purveyors of the terms do not like.
Theoretical unmentionables are especially vulnerable to this sort of
thing because their internal structure and content is . . .
277
unmentionable.

Bobbitt himself makes a similar but oblique objection to the
coupling of God and conscience. The last sentence of Bobbitt’s
account reads, “Decision according to law is an ideal, but it is also an
278
art and finally it is our piety, our ‘service to God.’” Bobbitt puts
“service to God” in quotes perhaps because he knows God has so
often fallen prey to the sort of moves Schlag describes, and perhaps
because he believes God can only do limited service in legal thinking.
Tellingly, following the last sentence of his work, Bobbitt cites
Nietzsche’s preface to the second edition of The Gay Science, in
which Nietzsche addresses this same problem:
And as for our future, one will hardly find us again on the paths of
those Egyptian youths who endanger temples by night, embrace
statues, and want by all means to unveil, uncover, and put into a
bright light whatever is kept concealed for good reasons. No, this
bad taste, this will to truth, to “truth at any price,” this youthful
madness in the love of truth, have lost their charm for us: for that
we are too experienced, too serious, too merry, too burned, too
profound. We no longer believe that truth remains truth when the
veils are withdrawn; we have lived too much to believe this. Today
we consider it a matter of decency not to wish to see everything
naked, or to be present at everything, or to understand and
279
“know” everything.

Would a God who remains covered, an unrenamed, nontheoretical God who is not an explanation satisfy Bobbitt’s piety?
277. SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 273, at 89–90.
278. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 163, at 186.
279. FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE GAY SCIENCE 38 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Random
House 1974) (2d ed. 1887).
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This is my hope, because this is the God I know, the God taught to
me by the scriptures and by my faith, one who does not fall prey to
the difficulties Schlag describes. God is not God because he is a
metaphysical, theoretical, or structural necessity—not because he is
needed as an explanation. But I know that he is God nonetheless
because I have seen heaven with the eyes of faith and love the
heavenly King.
The Book of Mormon contains a marvelous story in which a godly
man known only as “the brother of Jared” has a vision of the
280
premortal Christ. The brother of Jared had brought some stones
that he wanted the Lord to bless so that they would give light while
his people journeyed in darkened barges. God was speaking to the
brother of Jared from within a cloud. The account reports that God
reached out to touch the stones, and as he did so
the brother of Jared fell down before the Lord, for he was struck
with fear. . . . [A]nd the Lord said unto him: Arise, why hast thou
fallen? And he saith unto the Lord: I saw the finger of the Lord,
and I feared lest he should smite me; for I knew not that the Lord
281
had flesh and blood.

Of course, the brother of Jared was mistaken: he had seen not
flesh and blood but rather the Lord’s spirit. But God appeared to
have human form, and that is the aspect of the story which most
moves me. What other form was the brother of Jared expecting? He
must have expected another form because he lacked the revelation,
the actual experience. Rather than continue in uncertainty until he
knew the nature of God from actual experience, the brother of Jared
had leaped ahead. He had rationalized to himself “something about
the structure and content” of God, in Schlag’s words, or thought he
had “uncovered” God, in Nietzsche’s. When he learned the truth—
that God is not a subject for our rationalizations, our metaphysics,
our theories and objectifications about him, that his transcendence
does not mean that, then the brother of Jared feared because, as
faithful as he was, he knew that he did not love and trust God as he
might have. In a similar though lesser way, failure to confront the
moral decision in adjudication by reliance on the pretense that our

280. Ether 3–4 (Book of Mormon).
281. Id. at 3:6–8 (Book of Mormon).
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rationalizations, metaphysics, or theories actually resolve each
individual case in advance is a failure to trust, a failure of faith.
But then how do we resolve the dispute in adjudication, if
neither conscience nor God is structural identity, explanation, or
concept, and offers no analytical help? “Can’t you just tell me what
conscience requires?” most will say, again. I cannot, but the
revelations give at least two relevant directions. The first is that those
with well-developed, well-educated consciences should be sought for
and asked to serve in public office: “Wherefore, honest men and wise
men should be sought for diligently, and good men and wise men ye
should observe to uphold; otherwise whatsoever is less than these
282
It is as if the revelations realize that an
cometh of evil.”
explanation, a theory, isn’t enough. The honest, wise, and good
283
should be sought out. They will likely make honest, wise, and
good decisions. Their decisions will make our law more honest, wise,
and good. They are people of conscience.
The necessity of placing people of conscience in public office is
worth underscoring. The role of conscience in legal decision-making
is larger than even Bobbitt is willing to make it. Patterson, for
instance, notes that this sort of opening for conscience occurs not
only when the forms of argument conflict but also when one
wonders whether a particular form of argument is even appropriate
to the legal problem—whether legal practice should be changed in
284
some way. It also occurs when one wonders how to apply a form
of argument; doctrinal arguments, for instance, sometimes cut both
285
ways. And the modern judge when finding facts is often subject to
the same sorts of difficulties the medieval judges and juries faced, as
282. Doctrine & Covenants 98:10 (recording a revelation given August 6, 1833). The
time period in which the revelation was given accounts for its limitation to “men,” I believe. At
the time, women were allowed neither to vote nor serve at the bar. I see no need for this
limitation now. See also id. at 101:80 (giving a similar answer: “I established the Constitution
of this land, by the hands of wise men whom I raised up unto this very purpose”).
283. See, e.g., Phil. 4:8 (“[W]hatsoever things are true, . . . honest, . . . just, . . . pure, . . .
lovely, . . . [or] of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these
things.”) (emphasis in original); see also Articles of Faith 13 (Pearl of Great Price); C. Scott
Pryor, Mission Impossible: A Paradigm for Analysis of Contractual Impossibility at Regent
University, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 691, 717–29 (2000) (advocating that Christians take a
“multiperspectival approach”).
284. PATTERSON, supra note 166, at 174.
285. Bobbitt admits this. BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION, supra note 163, at 19 (discussing
two plausible yet opposed readings of Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947), that a
judge might apply to a hypothetical proposed by Bobbitt).
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is today’s jury when fact-finding or engaged in nullification of law.
The legislator and the voter in a referendum similarly face the need
to rely on conscience in creating legislation. As the forms of
argument available outside the typical common law or constitutional
legal practice increase, the opportunities for contradiction, paradox,
and incommensurability increase. That is where conscience and
character—honesty, wisdom, and goodness—become even more
important. The result is that if the legal system (assuming there is
such an objectification) is to be honest, wise, and good, it will be so
because the people in it are honest, wise, and good. In the end, there
may be no difference (or distance) between this subject (legal actors)
and object (legal system). This means not only that honest, wise, and
good people should be involved, if possible, but also that those
already involved must become more honest, more wise, and better.
The Christian has an answer to the question of how to achieve
this result. That is the second direction the revelations offer.
Through sanctification, we can become more honest, wise, and
good—we can educate the unspeakable conscience. Sanctification
286
287
comes by the law of God and his grace. Against the objection
that only believers have part in these, my faith at least affirms that
288
unbelievers do have part in the law of God by degrees. The gospel
289
of Christ in its fullest sense encompasses all truth, whether had by
290
Christians or others. The Christian perspective is thus not wholly
different from that of non-believers, though Christians potentially
286. See, e.g., Doctrine & Covenants 43:9, 76, 88:21–42. Pure love fulfills the law. See
Rom. 13:8–10; 1 Cor. 13:8 (“Charity never faileth”); 1 John 2–4; Helaman 3:35 (Book of
Mormon); Moroni 10:32 (Book of Mormon); Doctrine & Covenants 20:31.
287. See, e.g., Doctrine & Covenants 20:31 (“sanctification through the grace of our Lord
and Savior Jesus Christ is just and true, to all those who love and serve God with all their
mights, minds, and strength”); Helaman 3:35 (Book of Mormon); Moroni 10:32 (Book of
Mormon); Doctrine & Covenants 76:41–43, 76:59–61. Grace also changes hearts and makes
the love of God possible, which leads to grace. See, e.g., Enos (Book of Mormon) (Enos);
Mosiah 5:1–6 (Book of Mormon) (King Benjamin’s people); Mosiah 27 & Alma 36 (Book of
Mormon) (Alma the Younger); Alma 18:36–43, 19 (Book of Mormon) (Lamoni); Alma 22
(Book of Mormon) (Lamoni’s father).
288. Doctrine & Covenants 76:75, 76:103–06, 76:111–12, 88:17–37; see also Alma 29:8
(Book of Mormon). All those who are saved, to whatever glory, have been sanctified by God’s
law to some extent, by what they are willing to receive, and this includes many who as yet have
no explicit faith in Christ but will later bow and confess him, such as those mentioned in
Doctrine & Covenants 43:9, 76:43, 76:81–89, 76:98–112.
289. 1 Thess. 5:21; Phil. 4:8.
290. Doctrine & Covenants 84:47–47, 88:36–38, 93:24–30; BRIGHAM YOUNG,
DISCOURSES OF BRIGHAM YOUNG 10 (John A. Widtsoe comp., 1954).
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have the greater portion of truth that can be learned only by faith in
Christ. Sanctification is, among other things, to come to live the
291
truth. Both Christians and non-believers can grow on this score.
Christians have the added obligation to teach the truth and share the
love of Christ, so that others can learn the joy of their redemption
and become more sanctified by the exercise of faith in it. Thus,
Gordon B. Hinckley has described the mission of the Church: “To
292
make [the] bad . . . good and good . . . better.”
As workers in the law are sanctified, the law itself will become
293
sanctified. The more that workers in the law become sanctified, the
more truth they will live, the closer to truth will be their exercise of
conscience or faith in adjudication and legislation, and the more
closely law will serve its “true” purpose. In other words, the more
closely workers in the law live according to the will of God, the more
closely they will see the law come to serve its God-ordained purpose,
the protection and promotion of salvific freedom.

291. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 287–288.
292. Gordon B. Hinckley has said this is the Church’s mission on several occasions. See,
e.g., Gordon B. Hinckley, The International Role of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, May 13, 1999, reprinted at the website of the Los Angeles World Affairs Council, at
http://www.lawac.org/speech/hinckley.html (Mar. 12, 2002); Larry King Live, Rev. Robert
Schuller, Gordon B. Hinckley and Archbishop Desmond Tutu Discuss the Importance of Religion
(Dec. 24, 1999), transcript published at http://www.ldstoday.com/lkl-dec24.htm (Mar. 12,
2002).
293. No doubt some modern writer will take shots at this idea of “salvific freedom” or
“law by grace.” Once this sort of object has been created, the modern writer and I will become
subjects and the distance between the subjects and this object will be portrayed as
unbridgeable. Bobbitt himself takes such a modernist potshot, though not that exact one.
Bobbitt’s potshot instead objectifies “will to power” and “institutions” and then binds the two
together in a forced, democratic equality: the “will to power is equally distributed among all
institutions, including religious ones.” Philip Bobbitt, Reflections Inspired by My Critics, 72
TEX. L. REV. 1869, 1909 (1994). That is just the sort of metaphysical, practice-transcendent
myth that Bobbitt knows better than to engage in. He does this perhaps because Patterson has
made him feel defensive about using a pseudo-religious sort of language to talk about the
indescribable. Id. at 1910. Perhaps there is an anti-religious language game Bobbitt knows,
which I will not engage in, and I am mistaking his refusal actually to join a church for a
philosophical error. If so, then I simply disagree with Bobbitt.
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